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Although notions of excessiveness and disproportionality of pun-
ishment to the crime committed under the eighth amendment's "cruel
and unusual punishments"' clause were enunciated in Weems v.
United States2 in 1910, the Supreme Court has not actively utilized
the Weems doctrine since its inception. This hesitancy might be at-
tributed to the Court's uncertainty as to the constitutional and his-
torical justification of the Weems doctrine.
Regarding the historical foundation of the United States Consti-
tution and the eighth amendment, scholarship has in large part been
confined to, and understood solely through, English historical de-
velopments. The fact of English influence is not to be discounted; the
framers were concerned with preserving particular English guarantees,
as well as preventing specific English abuses. Clearly, the eighth amend-
ment has as one purpose the abolition of the torturous and brutal
methods of punishment that characterized Stuart England. English
intellectual and political history, however, did not provide the only
philosophical source of the eighth amendment. England and Amer-
ica of the 17th and 18th century did not exist in a political, economic
or philosophical vacuum.
It is imperative to shatter the unitary perspective through which
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights are viewed. The necessity
for accomplishing this task is due not only to the need to correct the
inaccuracy which prior single source scholarship has left for those in-
terested in understanding the history of our political institutions, but
it is also due to the need for lawyers and judges to know the true in-
tent of the framers in order that the principles which underlie the
words of the eighth amendment can be actively applied in today's
judicial system. English thinkers such as Bacon, Locke and Hobbes
were significant figures in the early stages of the Enlightenment, but
their thought was developed and refined on the European continent
before it influenced American political thought as expressed in the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Of paticular importance to a
complete understanding of the eighth amendment prohibition against
1. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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cruel and unusual punishments are the European philosophes-Vol-
taire, Montesquieu, and especially Beccaria. Beccaria's treatise On
Crimes and Punishments,3 together with the works on criminal law
reform of these other great thinkers, provided the philosophical basis
for the principle of proportionality of punishment. Since these works
influenced American colonial leaders, the principle of proportionality
must necessarily be reflected in the eighth amendment.
It is the purpose of this Comment to demonstrate the historical
and constitutional force of Beccaria's pronouncements. His ideas and
programs were not merely a guide for enlightened feudal monarchs
and legislatures to follow in reforming the criminal laws; rather, the
principles he propagated were of constitutional magnitude. His argu-
ments found their way into the fabric of the eighth amendment. An
analysis of the major Supreme Court decisions on that amendment
and its historic and philosophical bases will be the subject of Parts I
and II. This case analysis will demonstrate a split of authority. Some
courts perceive the eighth amendment as forbidding only physical
punishments, while others are willing to extend the concept of "cruel
and unusual" penalties to punishments which are excessive in light
of the nature of the offense. Only by analyzing the historic and philo-
sophical preconceptions regarding the eighth amendment which under-
lie the ratio decidendi of the cases can the bifurcation of opinion be
understood. Those courts which seek to interpret the eighth amend-
ment merely in terms of the English political and intellectual ex-
perience invariably conclude that the amendment forbids only phys-
ical and, to a lesser degree, mental punishments. However, Part III
of this Comment will demonstrate that those courts which see the
concept of proportionality as inherent in the eighth amendment are
also based on firm historical grounds. By examining the profound
influence of the Italian jurist Cesare Beccaria and the French phil-
osophes upon the revolutionary leaders who framed the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights, it will be made manifest that Weems v. United
States was correctly decided and that an increasing activism on the
part of courts in enforcing the prohibition against excessive or dispro-
portionate penalties is justified. A review of the recent state and fed-
eral court cases which have extended the reasoning in Weems, in
3. C. BECcARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (W. Paolucci transl. 1963).
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contrast to the present position of the Supreme Court, will be the sub-
ject of Part IV. The tension created by these conflicting trends can-
not long remain unresolved.
If the reason for the Supreme Court's reticence is uncertainty
as to the doctrinal correctness or historical basis of Weems, this Com-
ment shall clearly minimize any such doubt. The historical justification
for Weems proves that the Supreme Court decided Weems correctly
and that any withdrawal from enforcing the constitutional standards
enunciated in Weems is unsound. Rather, attorneys should challenge
excessive prison sentences under the eighth amendment and the courts
should strike down excessive sentences with a new certainty.
I. THE TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT:
"INHERENTLY CRUEL" MODES OF PUNISHMENT
One method of ascribing content to the eighth amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment has been to adopt a
fixed historical approach which attempts to ascertain "the particular
abuses that the framers of the Constitution had in mind to correct,
[by looking to] those immemorial usages in England that were not
rejected by the Colonies."4 This retrospective process has led, on one
extreme, to a rigid use of the English materials which allows only
those penalties which were actually proscribed at the time of the
adoption of the amendment to come within its protection. 5 However,
the use of the English historical sources has been somewhat more
flexible. Instead of limiting the eighth amendment protection to the
actual penalties outlawed in 18th century England, the English his-
torical content has been used to determine the category of punish-
ment which had been contrary to English law prior to the American
Revolution, and therefore, it is assumed, must have been the sole
concern of the framers of the Bill of Rights to prohibit also. This
somewhat broader use of historical purpose has consistently been em-
ployed by both legal writers and judges to demonstrate that the eighth
4. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 339 (1957). The author deals with the general Supreme
Court approach in giving content to the fourteenth amendment by the incorporation
of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
5. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
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amendment was intended by the framers to prohibit only barbaric and
torturous methods of punishment.6
This narrowly drawn intent-based analysis has led "the Court
as a whole, and sometimes individual justices . .. to suspect, if not
invalid, and to inconsistent, if not incompatible, methods and ex-
planations in applying the theory of the 'intent of the framers' to the
interpretation of the Constitution. ' 7 This orientation has elevated
one strand of eighth amendment jurisprudence, the prohibition
against tortures, to an unchallengeable and secure position with
limited meaning in the 20th century. Concomitantly, a second strand,
the excessiveness notion, has been virtually abandoned because of the
Court's failure to find a specific and particularized intent with which
to support it.
A. English Sources
The origin of the historical substance of the constitutional limita-
tion embodied in the eighth amendment has sometimes been traced
to the provisions of the Magna Carta,8 the document which so often
6. E.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 390 (1910) (White, J., dissenting).
Why the framers would be so concerned with something that had already fallen out
of favor is a question not often asked. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime,
77 HARv. L. REv. 1075 (1964).
7. C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 3 (1969). The
author quotes Jacobus ten Broek, concluding that this is one of the Supreme Court's
"fundamental doctrinal fallacies." Id. at 4.
8. See, e.g., Note, 34 MINN. L. REv. 134 (1950); Note, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 160,
161. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957), Chief Justice Warren merely repeats the
language in the above article. Id. at 100. He disregarded the content of the provision
as it appears in the Magna Carta itself. That provision reads:
20. A free man shall not be fined for a small offence, except in the propor-
tion to the measure of the offence; and for a great offence he shall be
fined in proportion to the magnitude of the offence, saving his freehold; and
a merchant in the same way, saving his merchandise; and the villain shall be
fined in the same way, saving his wainage, if he shall be at our mercy; and
none of the above fines shall be imposed except by the oaths of honest men
of the neighborhood.
21. Earls and barons shall be fined only by their peers and only in proportion
of their offence.
MAGNA CARTA, quoted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 15 (R. Perry ed. 1959) [herein-
after cited as Perry].
The relatively scarce citations to the Magna Carta in works on the eighth amend-
ment may have something to do with the language which seems to dearly convey the
idea of a prohibition of excessive punishment in favor of punishment proportioned to
the offense. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839 (1969).
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has been credited as the source for all the principal doctrines of our
personal liberties. However, it is the English Bill of Rights of 16899
which is said most often to be the origin of the phrase "cruel and un-
usual punishment,"'1 and the wording of the subsequent American
Bill of Rights, thus, has been seen as a mere verbatim copy with,
naturally, a coextensive meaning."' This obvious connection in lan-
guage has provided the impetus for judges, who are always anxious
to legitimate their opinions with ancient English precedent, to en-
deavor to discover just what the earlier document was intended to
forbid. A conspicuous source from which to begin such a search is
Blackstone's Commentaries,2 in which the cruel and unusual punish-
ment provision is said to have "a retrospect to some unprecedented
proceedings in the Court of King's Bench in the reign of King James
the Second."' 3 Most historians interpret Blackstone as referring to the
Bloody Assizes which followed the Monmouth Rebellion, the perjury
trial of Titus Oates, the treason trial of Algernon Sidney, and the
9. "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Quoted in Perry, supra note 8, at 247.
It is significant to note that a draft of a declaration presented to the English Com-
mons, on February 2, 1689, by Sir George Treby, read as follows: "19. The requiring
excessive bail of persons committed in criminal cases and imposing excessive fines, and
illegal punishments to be prevented." 10 H.C. JoUR. 17 (1688-1689), cited in Granucci,
supra note 8, at 854-55 (emphasis added). Similarly, a portion of the final draft of the
English Bill, which was enacted into law in December of 1689, complains of "illegal
and cruel punishments." For no apparent reason, however, clause 10 uses the seemingly
more narrow phrase "cruel and unusual punishments." Id. at 855.
Granucci writes concerning this language:
Indeed, John Somers, reputed draftsman of the Bill of Rights, wrote later of
the "horrible and illegal" punishments used during the Stuart regime. The
final phraseology, especially the use of the word "unusual," must be laid simply
to chance and sloppy draftsmanship. There is no evidence to connect the
cruel and unusual punishments clause with the "Bloody Assize." On the con-
trary, everything points away from any connection.
Id. (emphasis added).
10. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the
Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. Rv. 838 (1972); Note, The Effectiveness of the
Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
846 (1961); Note, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 160.
11. R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 19 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as RUTLAND]; Note, 34 MINN. L. Rav. 134, 135 (1950).
It should be mentioned that, in fact, the eighth amendment to the United States
Constitution is not an exact copy of the English Bill of Rights. The American version
substitutes the imperative "shall not" for the flaccid "ought not." This emphatic change
in a tone must not be overlooked. 2 T a BILL OF RIGHTS 1008 (B. Schwartz ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
12. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
13. Id. *448.
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generally excessive and arbitrary power wielded by both Chief Justice
Jeffreys and King James II which culminated in the Revolution of
1688.14 The protection of personal rights which was produced by the
reaction to such abuses has prompted some writers to suggest that the
amendment clearly proscribed those tortures used during the late
years of the Stuart Monarchy.15
B. The Supreme Court
Whether the colonists merely went beyond their ancestors in
drafting their laws, 16 whether they actually intended to give the phrase
a far different meaning than that which was intended by its English
counterpart,17 or whether the American framers misunderstood the
thrust of the English provision,18 the Supreme Court has continuously
used the search for the English origins of the eighth amendment as
the focal point and structuring concept for all its decisions interpret-
ing that amendment. Although it is difficult to define with precision
the extent of the eighth amendment protection, "it is safe to affirm
that punishments of torture. . . and all others in the same line of un-
necessary cruelty are forbidden."'19 Thus, not only would the amend-
ment forbid inhuman and torturous punishment, but it would also
prohibit other forms or modes of punishment which were marked by
inherent cruelty. 0 Therefore, in an early decision on the question,
the Supreme Court expressed the belief that legislatures possessed
the authority to prescribe the mode of execution for a prisoner even
14. I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 147-65 (1915).
15. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES§ 1896 (1970); Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 846, 847 (1961). However, this narrow
interpretation is historically incorrect for Blackstone clearly catalogues cruel punish-
ments including disembowelling alive, burning, whipping, or some degree of corporal pain.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *376. None had ceased in 1689, but were finally
abolished by statute in the 19th century. If such evidence can be taken to weaken the
causal connection between the prohibition of solely physical torture and those penalties
which were prohibited by the English Bill of Rights, content to the eighth amendment
can still be supplied with reference to the English historical materials as they could not
have been ignored by the former Englishmen who framed the provision.
16. See, e.g., RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 22.
17. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 377 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
18. See Granucci, supra note 8, at 860.
19. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
20. Note, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-Punishment
Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REv. 996, 997 (1964).
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if the method was not often resorted to at common law.21 This mini-
mum content of the provision was recognized in In re Kemmler=
2
where the English Declaration of Rights was used to circumscribe
the coverage of the eighth amendment. Thus, any penalty would be
unconstitutionally cruel if it involved "torture or a lingering death," 23
that is, "something inhuman and barbarous, something more than
the mere extinguishment of life." 24 Again, it is the mode of punish-
ment, here electrocution, which is challenged, and which the Court
felt may be legitimately reviewed.
In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber25 the Court was presented
with a distasteful factual situation. Willie Francis, who had been
convicted for murder and sentenced to death, managed to survive the
state's attempted electrocution presumably due to a mechanical failure.
When a second death warrant was issued, Francis appealed on the
ground that such a second execution would be unconstitutionally
cruel. Mr. Justice Reed, in stating the opinion of the Court, rejected
Francis' contention. He pointed to the "traditional humanity of mod-
em Anglo-American law [which] forbids the infliction of unnecessary
pain in the execution of the death sentence." 2 That "prohibition
against the wanton infliction of pain," 27 he derived from the English
Bill of Rights of 1689. "The cruelty against which the Constitution
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punish-
ment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed
to extinguish life humanely." Mr. Justice Reed then proceeded to
distinguish two categories of cruel punishment on the basis of the
purpose or intention of the punisher in inflicting physical pain.20
However, since there was no intent to impose unnecessary pain, the
Court had little difficulty in deciding this case. The standard for judg-
21. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878). Although English practice usually
consisted of hanging a convicted murderer by the neck until death, the Utah statute
permitted the imposition of capital punishment by the public shooting of the offender.
The Court easily dismissed the eighth amendment challenge by finding that the method
of shooting did not fall within the categories of torturous punishments forbidden under
the amendment. Id. at 135.
22. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
23. Id. at 447.
24. Id.
25. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
26. Id. at 463.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 464.
29. See also Note, supra note 20, at 1001-02 n.29.
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ing the constitutionality of a particular punishment remained the
examination of the mode of its infliction. It can be seen, therefore, that
the Court, at a minimum, has wholeheartedly accepted the history
of the cruel and unusual punishment provision as a protection against
barbarous modes of punishment.
One of the rare instances in which the Supreme Court declared
a law cruel and unusual was in Trop v. Dulles3° where the penalty
of denationalization for wartime desertion was struck down. Although
the rationale for the decision is unclear, Chief Justice Warren, writ-
ing for the majority, expressly rejected the argument that denationali-
zation could be considered excessive in relation to the nature of the
crime since such a crime is punishable by death.31 Therefore, "the
question is whether this penalty subjects the individual to a fate for-
bidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the
eighth amendment. '3 2 The Court was dearly concerned only with the
nature or mode of the punishment and not with the amount,3 3 and it
looked to the basic policy embodied in the English Declaration of
Rights for a standard of comparison by which to measure this punish-
ment. The Court found the measuring concept which arose from the
English tradition to be the "dignity of man." 34
While seeming to broaden the concept of cruelty to those punish-
ments which are "motivated by a purpose inconsistent with the recog-
nition of the humanity of the criminal," 35 Chief Justice Warren in fact
contributed significantly to the preservation of the existing judicial
concern with fixed standards when he stated: "Fines, imprisonment,
and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity
of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these tradi-
tional penalties is constitutionally suspect." 36 Yet, later in the same
30. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
31. Id. at 99.
32. Id.
33. Wheeler, supra note 10, at 841.
The Chief Justice's argument is . . . that as a punishment denationalization,
like torture, is inherently cruel .... For the Chief Justice, then, the cruelty
of denationalization arises from the nature of its impact upon the punished
individual and not from any disproportion between the punishment and the
crime. Denationalization is cruel per se: like torture, it may not be imposed
as a punishment for any crime, no matter how serious.
Note, supra note 20, at 998-99.
34. 356 U.S. at 100.
35. See Note, supra note 20, at 1002.
36. 356 U.S. at 100.
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paragraph, Warren suggested that the customary inhuman and bar-
barous test of constitutionality might finally become broader and
more flexible: "The Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."37 The vagueness and uncertainty of such a standard as com-
pared with the torture analysis, coupled with the inherent inconsistency
and lack of clarity of the decision itself, has reduced the potential im-
pact of Trop.
In its search for purposeful standards to give meaning to the
eighth amendment, the Supreme Court has usually employed the
method of legal historical analysis as its key tool in the process of con-
stitutional interpretation.38 In pursuing this methodology we have
seen the Court examine what it believes to be the historical reasons
which led to the constitutional restraint embodied in the cruel and
unusual punishment provision. A commentator has observed that
the Court determined early on that the problem which concerned the
framers of the eighth amendment and to which its provisions still seem
most relevant is the problem of the mode of punishment.3 9 The Court
has come to this conclusion through a reliance on English historical
sources 40 Through repetition in successive decisions this conclusion
has attained the stature of settled constitutional doctrine. While the
Court's methodology is valid, its conclusions are sometimes incorrect.
Errors are the inevitable result of the use of incomplete historical
sources. More specifically, the Court has relied on English history
while slighting the importance of the Enlightenment which swept
Europe and influenced the political ideology of the framers. Conse-
quently, the Court has limited itself to making analogies only to
37. Id. at 101.
38. Kadish, supra note 4, at 322.
39. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HRv. L. Rav. 1071, 1081(1964).
40. This conclusion has been successfully attacked:
The American framers and the dissenters in Weems believed that they were
being faithful to the interpretation of the English Puritans who had first
drafted the cruel and unusual punishments clause in 1689. However, a fresh
look at the history of punishment in England, and especially the framing of
the English Bill of Rights of 1689, indicates that the framers themselvcs
seriously misinterpreted English law. Not only had Great Britain developed,
prior to 1689, a general policy against excessiveness in punishments, but it
did not prohibit "barbarous" punishments that were proportionate to an
offense.
Granucci, supra note 8, at 843-44 (citations omitted).
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punishments practiced in 17th century England, while a much broader
analogical basis would be possible within the established historical
methodological model. Incorporating these Enlightenment doctrines
into the historical method of reasoning would insure that the eighth
amendment becomes the viable protection it was meant to be, rather
than an historical curiosity with limited contemporary impact.
II. WEEMS V. UNITED STATES AND THE EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT DOCTRINE
A. The Field Dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont41
The judicial hesitancy that is engendered by the Court's rigid
adherence to historical particularism 42 has continued to manifest itself
in the relative scarcity of Supreme Court decisions dealing with the
eighth amendment. As the use of physical torture began to fade in favor
of long, but allegedly more humane, imprisonment, defendants began
urging alternate grounds on which to invoke the eighth amendment's
protection.
The issue of cumulative penalties was raised in O'Neil v. Ver-
mont43 where the defendant, a New York liquor retailer, was found
guilty of 307 separate offenses of illegal sale in Vermont, a dry state,
and was sentenced to prison for a term of 54 years.44 The majority of
the Supreme Court did not even reach the question of the cruelty
of the penalty, holding that a federal question had not been assigned
as error or even suggested in O'Neil's brief. In any event, the Court
stated that it had always been determined that the eighth amendment
did not apply to the states. Although the English origins are nowhere
mentioned in the decision, their continued force is implicit in the
petitioner's failure to claim that a lengthy term of imprisonment can
itself be qualitatively or inherently cruel in much the same way as
torture.45
41. 144U.S. 323,337 (1892).
42. The term historical particularism is used herein to refer to the tendency of
the courts to single out individual acts or objections as the focal point for analysis,
rather than attempting to uncover the broader conceptions and principles that underlie
a constitutional provision.
43. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
44. The sentence at trial was a fine of $20.00 for each offense plus court costs
which had to be paid on a certain date. If the defendant could not afford to pay, he
would be committed to jail for three days for each dollar owed.
45. See generally Note, supra note 20, at 1004.
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Mr. Justice Field, in a dissenting opinion which suggested a
broader interpretation of the punishments included under the eighth
amendment, used traditional historical sources to support an argu-
ment that both the character and quantity (or degree) of punishment
can make excessive terms of imprisonment susceptible to the "cruel
and unusual" prohibition. He relied on the language of the eighth
amendment itself and noted:
The inhibition is directed, not only against punishments of the charac-
ter mentioned, but against all punishments which by their exces-
sive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses
charged. The whole inhibition [of the eighth amendment] is against
that which is excessive either in bail required, or fine imposed, or
punishment inflicted.46
Justice Field did not rest his argument solely on the eighth
amendment. He correctly invoked the fifth amendment47 which limits
the government's ability to infame48 private citizens and clearly recog-
nized the interrelationships that pertain among the amendments
that comprise the Bill of Rights. 49 He did not intend to let the indi-
46. 144 U.S. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
47. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
48. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), where Justice Douglas
writes of infamy:
The curse of infamy . .. results from public opinion. Oppression occurs when
infamy is imposed on the citizen by the State. The French jurist, Brissot
de Warville, wrote in support of Beccaria's position, "It is in the power of the
mores rather than in the hands of the legislator that this terrible weapon of
infamy rests, this type of civil excommunication, which deprives the victim
of all consideration, . . . which isolates him in the midst of society. The
purer and more untouched the customs are, the greater the force of infamy."
I Theorie des Loix Criminelles (1781) 188. As de Pastoret said, "Infamy,
being a result of opinion, exists independently of the legislator; but he can
employ it adroitly to make of it a salutary punishment." Des Loix Penales
(1790), Pt. 2, 121.
Id. at 452-53 (footnotes omitted).
49. For a discussion of these interrelationships, see Franklin, Contribution to an
Explication of the Activity of the Warren Majority of the Supreme Court, 24 BUFFALO
L. REv. 487 (1975).
However, Article 1.1.22.1,3 of the Mexican constitution, indicates not only the
deterrorizing force of the fifth amendment, but perfects it by uniting to it
what is contained in the eighth amendment of the American text. The Mexican
text says that
[p]unishment by mutilation and infamy, branding, flogging, beating
with sticks, torture of any kind, excessive fines, confiscation of prop-
erty and any other unusual or extreme penalties are prohibited.
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vidual amendments or clauses within an amendment be limited or
made impotent by viewing them in splendid isolation. As Justice
Field stated, "the cruelty of it, in this case, by the imprisonment at
hard labor, is further increased by the offenses being thus made in-
famous crimes."50
B. Weems v. United States51
The position that the eighth amendment is directed against not
only those punishments which include physical pain, but also those
which by their aggregate weight are out of proportion to the offenses
committed, 52 has not often gained acceptance.53 The first Supreme
Court case to declare a law cruel and unusual within the meaning of
the amendment, and the case which forbids punishments which are in
some sense excessive in relation to the offense, is the Weems decision.54
Capital punishment for political offenses is likewise pro-
hibited....
Id. at 534. See also Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and its
Implications for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut; South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 40 TUL. L. REv. 487 (1966).
50. 144 U.S. at 340 (emphasis added). Field continued: "[T]he selling of the
liquors in New York during three years, upon three hundred and seven distinct orders
from Vermont, that is, one in every three or four days, to be paid for on delivery in
the latter State, are declared by the punishment inflicted three hundred and seven in-
famous crimes." Id. at 341. While the importance of Justice Field's dissent for the
proposition that punishment may be excessive in relation to the offense has been noted
by every commentator dealing with the eighth amendment, nowhere amongst them is
the substance of his argument (i.e. linking the fifth and eighth amendments) dealt with.
See, e.g., Turkington, Unconstitutionally Excessive Punishment: An Examination of the
Eighth Amendment and the Weems Principle, 3 CmRI. L. BULL. 145, 146 (1967); Note,
The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 846, 853 (1961); Note, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 160, 165.
51. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
52. 144 U.S. at 340.
53. McWilliams v. United States, 394 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1968); Black v. United
States, 269 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Alberty v. United States, 91 F.2d 461 (9th Gir.
1937); Scala v. United States, 54 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S.
554 (1932). All these decisions held that as long as the sentence for a single count
was within reasonable statutory limits, the cumulative effect would not bring the total
sentence within the proscription of the eighth amendment.
54. Packer, supra note 6, at 1075, argues that the Weems decision deals with the
mode rather than the proportion of punishment. While the language of the case
speaks in terms of excessive severity, the factual situation deals with a penalty involving
chains and complete loss of civil and political rights. Such a punishment can also
call forth modern humane outrage analogous to that which arose over torture in
previous times.
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The defendant was convicted in a Philippine court for falsifying
public records. For this offense, Weems was sentenced to a minimum
of 12 years in chains at hard and painful labor, a fine, plus certain ad-
ditional penalties including denial of all assistance from outside the
prison, denial of all civil rights while in prison, permanent denial of all
political rights, and subjection to official surveillance for the rest of his
life. Mr. Justice McKenna, writing for a majority of the court, re-
versed. 5 He stated that
it is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies
and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in its character. Its punish-
ments come under the condemnation of the Bill of Rights, both on
account of their degree and kind.56
This language demonstrates that it was the combination of an excessive
but conventional mode of punishment as well as its obvious severity
which made the punishment void. However, Justice White, in his
dissent, characterized the opinion as striking down solely dispropor-
tionate penalties. It is this interpretation which has for the most part
been adopted in subsequent scholarship 57 and in state and lower
federal court opinions.58
The Supreme Court decided the Weems case under the applicable
provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which was determined to
have the same meaning as the eighth amendment of the United States
Constitution. 9 The Court, therefore, looked to its traditional English
sources to find a rationale for the decision. Realizing that the customary
use of the English materials would provide little or no support for a
proportionality argument, Mr. Justice McKenna barely mentioned
the historical connection which had previously provided the funda-
mental ground for every decision under the eighth amendment. 0
55. The majority of the Court concurring in the decision consisted of four
Justices, McKenna, the Chief Justice, Harlan and Day, while the minority was made
up of two, White and Holmes. The case had been argued before seven Justices but
one died before the opinion was delivered. The question remains as to whether
the Court's later reluctance to rely on the Weems decision is attributable to the fact
that Weems was only a plurality opinion.
56. 217 U.S. at 377.
57. Turkington, supra note 50, at 147. But see Packer, supra note 6, at 1075.
58. See text accompanying notes 229-53 infra.
59. 217 U.S. at 367.
60. Id. at 368. One commentator on the English origins of the phrase cruel and
unusual punishment has pointed out that the American framers misinterpreted the
intent of the English Bill of Rights which was meant to prohibit excessive punishments
and punishments disproportionate to the offense, but not "barbarous punishments that
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Avoiding the implications of Wilkerson and In re Kemmler for the
torture analysis, the Court pointed to the dissent of Mr. Justice Field
in O'Neil v. Vermont which provided the only case law precedent for
the approach taken in this decision. This dissent has been called "the
first explicit statement in a Supreme Court case that the eighth amend-
ment forbids. . . punishments.. . excessive in relation to the crime." 61
Having only one previous dissent on which to rely for validation of
the proportionality analysis, Justice McKenna examined the debates
at the Virginia and Pennsylvania Constitutional Conventions. He
found a paucity of historical evidence too weak to actually support
or refute either position as to what the eighth amendment was in-
tended to prevent. Faced with the void left by the lack of historical
guidance, Justice McKenna began to look for the underlying princi-
ples of the provision apart from the well-settled precedent. Employ-
ing such methodology, Justice McKenna refused to cast his arguments
in a narrow and particularistic form. He abruptly and convincingly
dismissed the idea that the Stuart abuses, which were assumedly a
concern of the framers, established the entire content of the eighth
amendment. 62 Instead Justice McKenna focused his analysis on the
more basic preoccupation of the framers: "Their predominant politi-
cal impulse was distrust of power, and they insisted on constitutional
limitations against its abuse."'
Within this framework, then, Justice McKenna found the cen-
tral concept or "motive" behind the eighth amendment's prohibition
to be an attempt to protect the citizens from the possibility of a
"coercive cruelty" being exercised by governmental authority. He ex-
plained his notion of "coercive cruelty" saying that "there was more
to be considered than the ordinary criminal laws. Cruelty might
were proportionate to the offense." Such an interpretation gives rise to a dilemma as
to whose intention should actually govern the Supreme Court's explication of the eighth
amendment: the intention of the English framers or the misinterpretation of the
American framers. Granucci, supra note 8.
61. Note, supra note 20, at 1004.
62. 217 U.S. at 372.
But surely they intended more than to register a fear of the forms of abuse
that went out of practice with the Stuarts. Surely, their jealously of power
had a saner justification than that. They were men of action, practical and
sagacious, not beset with vain imagining, and it must have come to them that
there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted
bodily pain or mutilation.
Id.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
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become an instrument of tyranny, of zeal for a purpose, either honest
or sinister."0' 4 Thus, the crux of the Court's position can be stated as
a condemnation of state terrorism expressed through the threat of
excessive terms of imprisonment. 5
64. Id. at 373.
65. In this regard, Justice McKenna writes: "With power in a legislature great,
if not unlimited, to give criminal character to the actions of men, with power unlimited
to fix terms of imprisonment with what accompaniments they might, what more potent
instrument of cruelty could be put into the hands of power?" Id. at 372-73. As the
Court had noted in Wilkerson v. Utah, at times "other circumstances of terror, pain, or
disgrace were sometimes superadded." 99 U.S. at 135 (emphasis added). Similarly,
the Court in Trop v. Dulles stated: "This punishment [denationalization] is offensive to
cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands. It subjects the individual to a
fate of ever increasing fear and distress." 356 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added). This
aspect of the eighth amendment that prohibits disproportionate sentences, it must then
be noted, is only a portion of the more general constitutional limits imposed upon state
or legal terrorism. This more basic restraint upon government is reflected in the fifth
amendment. For example: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury . . . nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice in jeopardy of life or limb .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The grand jury and the petit jury, as provided in the sixth
amendment of the Constitution, were utilized to preserve for the people a means
whereby to veto or modify the actions of government that might infame or lead to the
imposition of criminal sanctions. Moreover, the double jeopardy provision is significant
also in this regard. It prevents the state from subjecting the accused to continuous
prosecution as a result of one transaction, and thereby condemning him to suffer endless
punishment-fear, terror, and infamy.
Discussing punishment and cruelty in the prisons-the excessive utilization of
solitary confinement--Circuit Judge Feinberg has stated:
In this Orwellian age, punishment that endangers sanity, no less than physi-
cal injury by the strap, is prohibited by the Constitution. Indeed we have
learned to our sorrow in the last few decades that true inhumanity seeks to
destroy the psyche rather than merely the body. . . . The possibility of end-
less solitary confinement is still there, unless the prisoner "gives in." The same
observation could be made if Sostre were tortured until he so agreed, but
no one would argue that torture is therefore permitted. The point is that the
means used to exact submission must be constitutionally acceptable, and the
threat of virtually endless isolation that endangers sanity is not.
[I] would hold that the punishment here, "which could only serve to de-
stroy completely the spirit and undermine the sanity of the prisoner," runs
afoul of the eighth amendment.
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion) (em-
phasis added).
Moreover, it should be noted that indeterminate prison sentences ought to be sub-
ject to an analogous attack. Otherwise, legislatures, by imposing one year to life inde-
terminate sentences for some or all offenses, could conceivably subvert effective review
under the eighth amendment since the precise penalty that attached to a particular
offense or offender would never be known until after the sentence was served. The
imposition of a wide-open indeterminate sentence then should be amenable to an at-
tack on its face due to the real threat of endless imprisonment and its deleterious
effect on sanity or, at a minimum, after some time had been served.
The intention is to limit the imposition of state terrorism, as well as the overt
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A critical factor in the resulting desuetude of the Weems deci-
sion has been the method by which Mr. Justice McKenna sought to
give content to the concept of excessive punishment. The Court at-
tempted to employ a comparative standard to determine if the provi-
sion under attack was disproportionate to the crime as measured against
similar offenses under American federal criminal laws and later Philip-
pine legislation." McKenna decided that the difference in the pre-
scribed punishments was so dramatic as to be more than an exercise
of legislative discretion; it was, instead, sufficiently aberrational to
condemn the sentence that Weems received. The theoretical im-
portance of this comparative analysis has remained only a latent force
in eighth amendment adjudication at the Supreme Court level be-
cause six years after Weems, in Badders v. United States,67 Justice
Holmes, who had joined in the Weems dissent, implicitly rejected the
comparative method as a means of implementing the proportionality
protection. In Badders the defendant argued that his sentence of 5
years imprisonment for each of five counts of mail fraud (i.e., 25 years
in total), one for each letter illegally deposited with the post office,
was cruel and unusual punishment because each deposit was con-
sidered a separate offense. The Court through Mr. Justice Holmes
held that the punishment did not violate the eighth amendment and
cited an earlier decision, Howard v. Fleming,6 where the Court stated
"[t]hat for other offenses, which may be considered by most, if not all,
of a more grievous character, less punishments have been inflicted
does not make this sentence cruel." 69 Thus, while the Weems princi-
ple has not been specifically overruled, Holmes succeeded in circum-
venting the proportionality requirement by insuring that the com-
parative means of implementation would be forestalled.
or concealed threat of the same. Naturally, legitimate and orderly protest can be sup-
pressed by the threat of overwhelming sanctions; the willingness to accept a justified
punishment for presenting a grievance or staging a protest may not extend to the ex-
treme of self-annihilation through subjecting the self to an indeterminate sentence of
1-50 years for a minor infraction of the social order. It might also be meaningfull
to ask whether any analogies exist with the "chilling effect" doctrine which proscribes
in terrorem legislation under the first amendment. See generally Franklin, supra note
49, at 499-511, 525-30.
66. 217 U.S. at 380-81.
67. 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
68. 191 U.S. 126 (1903).
69. Id. at 135-36.
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C. The "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause in the Supreme
Court After Weems
The Supreme Court has declared a law cruel and unusual punish-
ment only three times since Weems. Each time the Court has failed
to deal with the implications of the proportionality principle for con-
stitutional adjudication. 70 Not only have expectations as to the de-
lineation of a method by which to employ the Weems doctrine been
unfulfilled, but the complete lack of use of the decision may lead one
to conclude that the Court itself doubts the continuing constitutional
validity of the decision. An examination of the cases decided after
Weems may throw some light on what remains of the excessive punish-
ment principle in the United States Supreme Court.
The most important decision in terms of the Weems principle
is Robinson v. California,7 1 where the defendant was convicted under
a statute which made it a crime to be "addicted to the use of nar-
cotics." 72 The trial judge had instructed the jury that the defendant
could be convicted if he had the status of a drug addict whether or
not he had actually used narcotics while in Los Angeles. The statute
was construed to be in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments because the criminal punishment of an individual for an ill-
ness "would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of
70. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
71. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The closest important case in time to Weems was
Trop v. Dulles, which has been discussed previously as basically a mode case proceed-
ing under the standard of the dignity of man in light of the evolving standards of
decency of a mature society. See text accompanying notes 30-37 supra. Trop can
hardly be considered under the excessiveness rubric as Warren, in the majority de-
cision, points out that the death penalty would not be considered cruel, and as Frank-
furter points out in his dissent, denaturalization can hardly be more severe than death.
Turkington, supra note 50, at 153.
72. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1964) provided:
No person shall use, or be under the influence of narcotics, excepting
when administered by or under the direction of a person licensed by the
State to prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be the burden of the
defense to show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted of
violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year
in the county jail. The court may place a person convicted hereunder on pro-
bation for a period not to exceed five years and shall in all cases in which
probation is granted require as a condition thereof that such person be con-
fined in the county jail for at least 90 days. In no event does the court have
the power to absolve a person who violates this section from the obligation of
spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county jail.
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cruel and unusual punishment."7 In support of this premise, Mr.
Justice Stewart cited Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,74 a prece-
dent clearly in the mode tradition and concerned only with the avoid-
ance of "unnecessary pain" in the implementation of a statutory pun-
ishment. The citation can only confuse the reader as to what evil the
court actually intended to reach. The majority did not say, as has
been suggested, "that to punish sick people by imprisonment, instead
of trying to cure, them by compulsory treatment, is an act of inhuman-
ity against the afflicted person prohibited by the eighth amendment."7 5
Rather, the opinion explicitly recognized that penal sanctions may be
used against a person who is an addict as long as the purpose is the
more benevolent one of treatment and not solely punishment. Such
analysis is supported by the Court's use of the Francis case which did
focus upon the motives of the punishers. 76 However, the purposive
distinction is then obliterated by the Court's contradictory statement
that "even one day in prison would be cruel and unusual punishment
for the 'crime' of having a common cold."77 This language seems to
present a blanket proposition that any punishment unmindful of the
intention of the punishers would be cruel and unusual where an ill-
ness is concerned. 78 Because neither imprisonment itself, nor one day's
confinement for an act which is actually a crime, has ever been con-
sidered inherently cruel, one commentator has argued that
Robinson v. California may have established in the eighth amend-
ment a basis for invalidating legislation that is thought inappro-
pridtely to invoke the criminal sanction, despite an entire lack of
precedent for the idea that a punishment may be deemed cruel not
because of its mode or even its proportion but because the conduct
for which it is imposed should not be subject to criminal sanction. 79
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, also placed em-
73. 370 U.S. at 666. (This is the first time the eighth amendment has been ex-
plicitly applied to the states.)
74. See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
75. Note, supra note 20, at 1009-10.
76. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
77. 370 U.S. at 667.
78. Contra, Note, supra note 20. The author finds inherent in this quoted pas-
sage the idea of an excessive punishment in relation to the crime and, thus, views
Robinson as the progeny of the Weems decision. Id. at 1010. But see Turkington,
supra note 50, at 154.
79. Packer, supra note 6, at 1071.
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phasis on the state's power to determine what is criminal80 rather than
on the cruelty of the punishment as compared to the crime of addic-
tion.81 While he noted that both the mode of punishment and the pro-
portion of the punishment to the offense 2 may bring a sanction within
the ambit of the eighth amendment, Douglas concentrated on drawing
a comparison between the historic treatment of insanity within a crim-
inal context and the punishment of addiction by imprisonment so as
to indicate that a civilized approach to illness can no longer allow such
barbarous action. Thus, it was the categorization of an illness as a
crime which was not permissible, not merely the means chosen of
punishing it.
It is questionable whether Robinson really presented an eighth
amendment issue. One commentator has argued that by resting its
decision on the cruel punishment provision, the Court was avoiding
the more difficult question of limiting police power 3 in an area (nar-
cotics control) where the states have traditionally wielded wide regu-
latory authority. It has also been noted that in this regulatory sphere
it is impossible for the Court to make a blanket requirement of mens
rea in the categorization of certain activities as crimes.8 4 In addi-
tion, the application of the eighth amendment to the nature of the
conduct made criminal, instead of the method or kind of punish-
ment, represented a unique use of the amendment's protection. It
was so novel, in fact, that one Justice thought "the Court was hard
put to find a way to ascribe to the Framers of the Constitution the
result reached today rather than its own notions of ordered Liberty."8 5
It may be that the doctrinal uncertainty that emerged out of Robin-
son and obscured the precise eighth amendment standard utilized by
the Court is due to the lack of an accepted historical justification for
its action. This would explain the Court's failure to implement and
extend the principles, especially the excessive punishment doctrine,
it has found within the notion of the eighth amendment.8 6
80. Turkington, supra note 50, at 154.
81. 370 U.S. at 676.
82. Interestingly, he cited O'Neil v. Vermont for the proportionality concept and
not Weems.
83. Turkington, supra note 50, at 156.
84. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
85. 370 U.S. at 689 (White, J., dissenting).
86. The ambiguity as to the legitimacy of Robinson under the mode of pro-
portionality limitation of punishment, may have been the reason for the court's fail-
ure to extend Robinson in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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While Robinson gives little hope that the proportionality principle
of Weems will finally become accepted constitutional doctrine, there
has been some indication that vestiges of the excessive punishment
doctrine still remain. One of the rare instances where the issue sur-
faced was in Rudolph v. Alabamas7 in which three Justices dissented
from a denial of certiorari to a petitioner who argued that sentencing
him to death for rape was unconstitutionally excessive. Justices Gold-
berg, Douglas, and Brennan felt that this case presented the Court
with the opportunity to decide whether it would take an active role
in determining the appropriate relation between the crime and the
punishment. They phrased the issues presented in three questions:
1. In light of the trend both in this country and throughout the world
against punishing rape by death, does the imposition of the death
penalty by those States which retain it for rape violate "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of [our] maturing so-
ciety," or "standards of decency more or less universally accepted"?
2. Is the taking of life to protect a value other than human life
consistent with the constitutional proscription against "punishments
which by their excessive . . . severity are greatly disproportioned
to the offenses charged"?
3. Can the permissible aims of punishment (e.g., deterrence, isola-
tion, rehabilitation) be achieved as effectively by punishing rape
less severely than by death (e.g., by life imprisonment); if so, does
the imposition of the death penalty for rape constitute "unnecessary
cruelty"?s8
It is unclear whether these questions were intended to raise the issue
presented by Weems" or whether they are essentially more readily
comparable to the substantive due process issue of the rationality of
the means chosen by the legislature.9 0 However, the fact that only three
Justices on the Supreme Court would even attempt to grapple with the
question of excessive punishment, further weakens the viability of the
Weems doctrine.
87. 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
88. Id. at 889-91 (footnotes omitted).
89. The issues presented by Weems included the comparative approach here pre-
sented by question one in Rudolph, and the issue of the Supreme Court's power to
interfere with legislatively proscribed punishments, here represented by questions two
and three of Rudolph.
90. See Packer, supra note 6, at 1074.
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In Furman v. Georgia,91 the Supreme Court was presented once
again with the opportunity to evaluate and explicate the present
scope of the eighth amendment within the context of the important
question of the constitutionality of capital punishment. Instead of
meeting the challenge of deciding what constitutional limitations
could be imposed upon the legislature's power to select penal sanc-
tions, the Court, on the whole, retreated, and succeeded in further
obfuscating the import of the eighth amendment guarantee. The ma-
jority of the Court failed to deal with the constitutionality of capital
punishment in terms of the eighth amendment. Three Justices relied
on the arbitrariness of the way the punishment was applied, one
other majority Justice on a combination of the notions of arbitrari-
ness and the excessive severity of the method of punishment, and an-
other on the grounds that such punishment is simply excessive and
unnecessary with arbitrariness as supporting evidence of society's re-
jection of the punishment. This sidestepping was particularly unfortu-
nate since the factual situation of the case presented a unique oppor-
tunity for employment of the Weems principle of an inherent propor-
tion between the crime and the punishment. While one petition in
Furman involved a murder situation where the proportionality argu-
ment is obviously more difficult to make9 2 the two other petitions in-
volved convictions for rape. Thus, the latter two factual situations
could have been separated by the majority and decided under the
proportionality standards. However, none of the Justices dealt with
this problem, finding instead that the arbitrariness of the application
of the penalty93 constituted a denial of due process of law. As each
Justice submitted a separate opinion, it may be helpful to look briefly
at each one.
Mr. Justice Douglas employed a test based on an equal protec-
tion component which he found implicit in the cruel and unusual
punishment clause.94 This analysis allowed him to look at the capital
punishment laws not merely as they were written but as they were
applied. In their application, he found that they were arbitrary and
91. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
92. The Lex Talionis, an eye for an eye idea which originally manifested the
idea of proportionality, would seem to suggest that state murder is justified where the
individual has committed murder.
93. See generally C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF
CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974).
94. 408 U.S. at 249.
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discriminatory because of both standardless sentencing procedures,
upheld in McGautha v. California,95 and the relative rarity with which
the penalty was used. Mr. Justice Stewart also found arbitrariness the
primary characteristic of the prevailing system of capital punishment,
stating three reasons: (1) the "select handful upon whom the sentence
of death has in fact been imposed,"'9 6 (2) the relative rarity of its im-
position, and (3) the fact that its mode is excessive "not in degree but
in kind." 97 Mr. Justice White saw the arbitrariness of the punish-
ment in the fact that it was unnecessary in terms of achieving any so-
cial or public purpose.98 Only two Justices, Brennan and Marshall, at-
tempted to employ any variation of the proportionality concept, but
they too tended to mix this concern with elements of the traditional
use of the eighth amendment.9 That is, they were really concerned
with the mode of punishment, the death penalty as an impermissible
penalty, involving inherent pain and suffering, in much the same
category as the unconstitutional tortures. However, the measuring
concept has become the more sophisticated standard of public abhor-
rence100 or comporting with human dignity' 01 instead of physical
abuse. Thus, the majority merely purported to decide the death
penalty issue under the eighth amendment. In actuality, three Justices
used the due process standard of arbitrariness and looked to the proce-
dural aspect of how the capital punishment system was administered
rather than to the substantive due process protection against the
imposition of the sentence itself. Two other majority Justices found
95. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
96. 408 U.S. 309-10.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 312.
99. In his concurring opinion in Furman, Marshall wrote that "[p]unishment as
retribution has been condemned by scholars for centuries,8 5 and the Eighth Amend-
ment itself was adopted to prevent punishment from becoming synonymous with ven-
geance." Id. at 343. In footnote 85, Marshall then cited Beccaria's On Crimes and
Punishments as representative of such scholarship.
100. 408 U.S. at 332. It has been pointed out by one commentator that the test
of popular abhorrence is in essence a proportionality test.
The strongest evidence that a punishment [is disproportionate to a crime]
is evidence of public antipathy for the punishment in general or for its applica-
tion to a particular crime. . . . If juries were regularly refusing to convict
men of a particular crime when cognizant of the statutory punishment, it
would be absurd to contend that the punishment is proportional to the crime.
Wheeler, supra note 10, at 850.
101. 408 U.S. at 271. For a fuller discussion of the opinions of Brennan and
Marshall, see Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment II, 25 STAN. L. REV.
62 (1972).
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a connection-provided in some sense by the Weems idea of excessive
penalties-between the sanction and the way it was applied. The
minority, on the other hand, employed the comparative sentence ap-
proach and found the death penalty constitutional in the traditional
sense.
The meaning of the Weems doctrine in Supreme Court adjudica-
tion is obviously uncertain. Any hope that the Robinson decision
would revitalize the excessive punishment principle was effectively
dispelled by Powell v. Texas'02 which reiterated the Court's concern
with the distinction between a status and an act rather than between
an act and a punishment which is the basis of the proportionality
idea. Any other remnants of Weems were further weakened by Fur-
man where the opportunity to use it was ignored by all except two
Justices, and even they commingled it with traditional elements of
eighth amendment interpretation. Perhaps an account of the intellec-
tual origins of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause can serve
as the means for clarifying the import of the Weems doctrine in future
adjudication.
III. THE INFLUENCE OF BECCARIA AND THE
ENLIGHTENMENT ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
In order to establish the historical basis upon which rests the
constitutional principle that punishment for crime should be to some
extent graduated and proportioned to the offense, it is necessary to
inquire into the reasons which led to the constitutional restraints em-
bodied in the Bill of Rights in general, and the eighth amendment in
particular. While it is generally accepted that the American Revolu-
tion was in origin a protest against English oppression, 103 the Bill of
Rights has a much broader scope; it is in essence "a criticism of general
feudal arbitrariness."' 04 The political and social ideas of the European
Enlightenment, together with early American political experience,
formed the underlying rationale for the Bill of Rights-the protec-
tion of the private realm against governmental power.10 It is, therefore,
102. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
103. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 248 (1973).
104. Franklin, The Encyclopediste Origin and Meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
15 LAW. GUILD REv. 41 (1955).
105. Accord, H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 256 (1956).
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necessary to examine the writings of certain Enlightenment figures
which were received by Jefferson and other colonial leaders'0 6 and in-
corporated in the early state constitutions and then in the United
States Constitution, to determine the boundaries of legal punishment.
The Enlightenment of the 18th century was both a continental
European and English phenomenon. It was based on common experi-
ence shared by the leading secular thinkers of the period which grew
out of their pursuit of rationalism as the balancing rubric between
their affinity for Roman and Greek antiquity and the resulting ten-
sion with their Christian heritage.1 7 The development of the analyti-
cal spirit which marked 18th century thought was the work of three
generations of thinkers. 08 The first of these was dominated by Voltaire
and Montesquieu and ended by 1750. The second generation, which
included Benjamin Franklin, Hume, Rousseau and Diderot, empha-
sized analysis and dissection and began the task of applying thought
to the shaping of its own view of what life should be like. Finally,
the third generation, that of Beccaria, Kant, and Thomas Jefferson,
moved into -the concrete arenas of practical politics and legal reform. 09
Thus, the Enlightenment can be seen as a coherent evolutionary period
bearing within it both the deists with their concern for natural law,
and the atheists, who were devoted to modern science and utilitarian
goals. The significance of the ideas and writings of the leading think-
ers of the period had a large impact on the educated world of Europe
and America. There is undeniable evidence that the prominent and
politically active men in America were fully cognizant of the writings
of not only "the radical publicists and opposition politicians of the
early Eighteenth Century England who carried forward into the age
of Walpole the peculiar strain of anti-authoritarianism bred in the up-
heaval of the English Civil War,"'"1 but also the continental reformers
and social critics such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Bec-
caria."' And, it is known that these ideas were studied earnestly by
the revolutionary leaders, during and after the war, in an effort to re-
106. Franklin, supra note 102, at 41. See Gay, The Enlightenment, in THE CoM-
PARATIVE APPROACH To AMERICAN HISTORY 38-39 (C. Vann Woodward ed. 1968).
107. P. GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION 9 (1966).
108. E. CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 28 (1951).
109. P. GAY, supra note 107, at 17.
110. B. BAiLYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS IX-X (Vintage 1970).
111. B. BAXLYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF TIE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27
(Belknap Press 1967).
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form their own institutions.112 On the Continent, too, the ideas of the
Encyclopedists of the 18th century formed the foundation for the
doctrine of human and civil rights which became the Declaration of
Human Rights of the French Assembly of 1789 and gave the doctrine
of inalienable rights the power witnessed in the French Revolution
itself.113
A. Beccaria and Enlightenment Criminal Law Reform
One aspect of late 18th century thought was the systematic attack
mounted by the Encyclopedists against feudal criminal law through-
out Europe. The philosophers who began to rethink the premises on
which their systems of criminal law rested found their spokesman in
Cesare Beccaria, whose treatise On Crimes and Punishments"4 was
written in Italy in 1764. It was Beccaria who suggested that the ideas
underlying the penal systems of his time were Wrong. He argued for a
more enlightened criminal code and popularized the notion that, as
one commentator has noted, "the punishment of an offender proved
guilty is supposed to fit [in some metaphysical way] the crime that has
been proved." 15 Thus, Beccaria, in effect, anticipated the meaning
which the Weems court was to find implicit in the eighth amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishments.1"6
112. Bailyn, Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eikhteenth Cen-
tury America, in THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE AiMiERICAN REVOLUTION 277, 283
(J. Greene ed. 1968).
113. E. CASSIRER, supra note 108, at 250. Although it has been argued that there
is no historical connection between Enlightenment philosophy and the French Dec-
laration of Human Rights, the ideas expressed therein cannot be seen simply as aris-
ing out of the narrower context of the English religious controversies of the preceding
century. Nor can it be said, as Georg Jellinek maintains in his work, The Declaration
of Human and Civil Rights, that the American state and federal bills of rights are
the ancestor of the French declaration. As Cassirer points out, the American pro-
visions sprang from the generalized development of natural law concepts which were
evidenced throughout Europe and not from a straight line progression of purely English
thought. The roots of personal freedom stretched much further back than the American
Revolution which only formalized and symbolized Enlightenment liberalism rather than
being the source for the concepts. E. CASSIRER, supra note 108, at 248-49; Franklin,
supra note 104, at 51.
114. C. BECCARiA, supra note 3.
115. K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 62 (1966). It is suggested,
however, that evolving enlightened and unalienated public opinion protected by the
first amendment, will determine the precise meaning of this proposition. See Franklin,
Further Considerations Relating to Romanist Infamy and the American Constitutional
Conception of Impeachment, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 29, 32 (1974).
116. Franklin, supra note 104, at 43-44. The author draws this kind of connec-
tion between Beccaria and the fifth amendment.
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The criminal law which Beccaria encountered was certainly in
need of fundamental reforms. The death penalty and bodily mutila-
tions were the usual punishments for the majority of crimes, even
minor offenses. The lack of codified laws and scales of punishment
allowed arbitrariness in administration to become the primary at-
tribute of the criminal system in all European countries including
England.117 Against this background, Becarria began by analyzing the
origin of penalties and the right of punishment."8 Employing Rous-
seau's social contract theory, Beccaria agreed that men, in forming
their society, yielded the least possible portion of their individual
liberty in exchange for peace and security. Therefore, "[p]unishments
that exceed what is necessary to preserve the deposit of the public
safety are in their nature unjust." 19 A consequence of this principle
was that if it were possible to prove that the severity of a punishment
did not add to its utility, it would be contrary to justice and the social
contract to retain such a punishment.120
While subscribing to the principle that punishment should be
proportioned to the crime, Beccaria foreshadowed modem theories of
penology when he asked the reason for punishing a criminal.12 ' He
rejected the theory of retribution in favor of the prevention of future
injury and the deterrent effect that would result from the certainty
(rather than the severity) of the penalty. 22 "For a punishment to
attain its end, the evil which it inflicts has only to exceed the advan-
tage derivable from the crime .... All beyond this is superfluous and
for that reason tyrannical."'2 3 Beyond the abuse of power Beccaria
found inherent in the notion of severe penalties which arose from his
conception of the nation as a social contract, there were dangers to
the system of criminal justice itself. Firstly, the very severity of the
punishment would lead men who have committed a crime to dare to
commit more evils in the hope of avoiding the penalty for the orig-
117. For a more detailed discussion of the state of the criminal law, see M.
MAESTRO, VOLTAIRE AND BECCARIA AS REFORMERS OF CRIMINAL LAW 1-13 (1942).
118. See generally Franklin, The Contribution of Hegel, Beccaria, Holbach and
Livingston to General Theory of Criminal Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL PER-
SPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 94-125 (C. Madden ed. 1968).
119. C. BECCARIA, supra note 3, at 13.
120. Id.
121. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 36 (1968).
122. See Comment, The Plea Bargain in Historical Perspective, 23 BUFFALO L.
REV. 499, 510 n.58 (1974).
123. C. BECCARIA, supra note 3, at 43.
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inal crime. Secondly, a just proportion between the crimes and punish-
ments is necessary:
The severity of punishment not only aggravates the likelihood that
inhuman deeds will be committed, but also maintaining the essential
proportion between the crime and the punishment becomes impossible
because there is a limit to human endurance which necessarily meas-
ures the extremes of punishment as also impunity itself arises from
the severity of the punishment as such cruelty is fatal to a constant
system.124
Thus, Beccaria explained why every punishment must only be im-
posed in keeping with a fixed set of laws aimed at protecting the pub-
lic welfare and, within this general framework, the scale of punish-
ments should be graduated and commensurate with the harm done to
society by the act of the criminal.
Beccaria was not alone among 18th century thinkers in his con-
cern with criminal law reform. Due to the -influence of humanistic
trends on the Continent and in England in the first part of the cen-
tury, the protests and criticisms of the criminal system had already
become numerous.125 It took, however, almost half the century for the
emergence of the realization that the entire field of criminal admin-
istration needed basic reform. An important step, but by no means a
systematic treatment of the problem, was begun in Montesquieu's The
Persian Letters,2 6 first published in 1721.127 The question of the
severity of punishments was treated in terms of its implications for
the society as a whole. For the first time, the opinion was clearly ex-
pressed that obedience to the law does not correspond to the increase
in the severity of the punishment imposed for breaking the law.123 In
addition, Montesquieu recognized the necessity for a just proportion
between the offense and the punishment and found injustice in a sys-
tem which tries to intimidate its members into submission merely by
124. Id. at 43-44. See also Comment, supra note 122, at 526. The author rein-
forces Beccaria's point by noting that draconian punishments tend to accelerate the
frequency of plea bargains and thereby increase arbitrariness and disrupt the po-
tentiality for a "constant system."
125. M. MAESTRO, CAESARE BECCARIA AND THE ORIGINS OF PENAL REFORM 17
(1973).
126. MONTESQuiEu, THE PERSIAN LETTERS (Bobbs-Merrill 1964).
127. See generally H. MERRY, MONTESQUIEU'S SYSTEMI OF NATURAL GOVERNMENT
263-71 (1970).
128. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 126, at 136.
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the magnitude of the punishments provided. However, the great work
of Montesquieu concerning the criminal law appeared some 25 years
later. In Spirit of the Laws'29 he made several important points in terms
of an enlightened view of punishment. He drew a direct connection
between the kind of government one has, the severity of the punish-
ment that would appear therein, and the effect that the punishment
has on the inhabitants of that nation. Thus, Montesquieu explained
that more lenient penalties characterize more moderate governments,
and that the citizens of such enlightened nations are as affected by
these lesser penalties as those living in despotic countries are by
severer punishments.130 Montesquieu, who antedated Beccaria, recog-
nized as essential that there should be a certain proportion in punish-
ments, and that excessive punishment, such as punishing all crimes
with death, hindered rather than facilitated the execution of the
law.131 His Spirit of the Laws was one of the first works to treat the
problem of criminal law critically and extensively, and, as such, is
considered to be of great importance to the 18th century movement
for criminal law reform.
In addition to Montesquieu, whom Beccaria openly recognized as
a large influence on his work, 32 Voltaire succeeded in drawing popular
attention to many abuses of the criminal law. While there is some evi-
dence of an unfocused interest in criminal law in Voltaires' writings,
he had not shown a definitive opposition to any particular aspect of
the system or an interest in reform until 1762.133 At that time, his
piecemeal opposition developed into an active program of redressing
judicial errors. After having read Beccaria's treatise in 1765,134 Voltaire
began to assume a more radical position toward criminal law reform.
In 1766, he published a Commentary on Beccaria's treatise in which
129. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Hafner Library 1949).
130. Id. at 81-83.
131. Id. at 87.
132. M. MAESTRO, supra note 125, at 18 n.19.
133. M. MAESTRO, supra note 117, at 35-50. This change was brought about by
the trial of Jean Calas who was convicted of murdering his son and sentenced to be
put to death at the wheel. As soon as Voltaire became convinced that the son had
committed suicide and that the father had been unjustly punished, he began his
campaign to revise the decision of the trial. While he was thus working, the faults
of the French criminal system were becoming increasingly evident. For the first time,
by attempting to obtain publicity in the Calas case, Voltaire pointed up the dangerous-
ness of secret procedures which could, as they had in the case before him, lead to
arbitrariness and injustice.
134. Id. at 73.
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he took a position largely in agreement with the points that Beccaria
had made. Voltaire's Commentary had a great impact on the reform
movement as he was the most popular writer of his century. In addi-
tion, the prestige that accrued to Beccaria's text when the Commentary
was added as a preface provided the impetus necessary for the transla-
tion of the combined edition into all the primary European lan-
guages.' 35
In England, which had been the model of a more reasonable
criminal system for the Continental countries, criticism of some
aspects of the legal structure began to be made. Blackstone, in his
Commentaries,136 first published one year after Beccaria's treatise ap-
peared, found the English criminal system much closer to perfection
than those of other nations. However, even in England, there were
some "particulars" which did need revision. 37 In fact, "[t]he extent
to which Sir William Blackstone was critical of English law is not
always fully appreciated."' 138 He clearly recognized the influence of
Montesquieu and Beccaria who had pointed out the injustices exist-
ing in other systems, 39 and attributed to them the ideas that crimes
which are most destructive of public safety should be the ones most
severely punished, certainty of punishment was more important than
its severity, and punishments should be proportioned to the offense. 140
135. Id. at 93. While the ideas which appeared in Beccaria's treatise and which
also concerned Voltaire may not have been completely new, the success of the move-
ment which grew out of this source occurred largely because for the first time principles
of penal reform had been expressed in a systematic manner. In France itself, where
Voltaire's support had helped create a favorable attitude toward reform, the tide
quickly moved toward a more radical position than Voltaire had ever taken. Voltaire,
who had hesitated to favor the abolition of capital punishment, was supplanted by
Michel Sevran who was to strongly endorse all of Beccaria's theories. M. MAESTRO,
supra note 125, at 126. Further writings appeared calling for outright reforms by such
noted men as Brissot de Warville, Marat, Condorcet, and Pastoret. In addition to
France, where the conservative position remained powerful, Beccaria's ideas began to
take hold in Italy, his home state, and in Germany and Poland. His work was even
condemned by the Inquisition in Spain. In Prussia also, where Frederick II was him-
self a forerunner of the reform movement, the principles of Beccaria gained most easy
acceptance since they were not in general conflict with the interests of the rulers as
in the other nations. Indeed, Frederick and Voltaire carried on a correspondence con-
cerning a new criminal code which he had begun to write which made the laws milder
and concentrated on the prevention of crimes instead of their punishment. Id. at
134-35.
136. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
137. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3.
138. 1 L. RADZINoWICz, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAw 345 (1948).
139. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 137.
140. Id.
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The latter idea he terms overly romantic but nevertheless suggests
that "the wise legislator will mark the principle divisions, and not as-
sign penalties of the first degree to offenses of an inferior rank."' 41 Thus,
it appears that only one year after its publication, the ideas of Bec-
caria had attained such wide impact that they already were being read
and used by even such a conservative commentator as Blackstone.' 42
B. The Reform Influence in America in General
The force of Beccaria's treatise On Crimes and Punishments was
felt as much in America as in Europe.'4 There were three American
translations of Beccaria, each coupled with Voltaire's Commentary,
which were published in America before the formulation of the Bill
of Rights. 44 They became immediately popular at both bookstores
and lending libraries. 45 In every colony, the ideas and writings of
such social critics and reformers as Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu,
and Beccaria were known and often quoted.146 As Justice Douglas
recognized nearly two centuries later: "[T]he Italian jurist Beccaria
and his French and English followers influenced American thought
in the critical years following our Revolution."' 47 To ignore these
philosophers' theories of criminal law, therefore, would be tantamount
to cutting oneself off from the very meaning of the Constitution.
The widespread popularity of Beccaria's treatise is evidenced
clearly by the fact that, in 1770, John Adams, then a young lawyer,
141. Id. at *18.
142. Id. at *'12-16. The question of the severity of the penalties imposed on of-
fenders in England had already been under some criticism, and although there were
reform currents among writers of the period, reform was extremely slow in coming,
finding fruition only in the next century. M. MAESTRO, supra note 117, at 133.
143. In the aftermath of the [American] Revolution, however, a spark of
'interest appeared, lit by Enlightenment ideology and an awareness of very
dramatic events in Europe. Just as Beccaria had insisted that humane laws
could eradicate crime, so men like Tuke in England and Pinel in France
insisted that kind and gentle treatment would help to cure insanity.
D. ROTHMAN, THE DiscOvERY OF THE ASYLU 109-10 (1971).
144. BARR, VOLTAIRE IN AMERICA 1774-1880, at 121 (1941).
145. Id.
146. Bailyn, supra note 112, at 282; B. BAiLYN, supra note 111, at 27; see F.
BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON-AN INTIMATE HISTORY 98 (1974).
147. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 450 (1956) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting). In his dissent, Justice Douglas draws freely from Franklin, supra note 102,
to demonstrate the influence of Beccaria and the Enlightenment on the fifth amend-
ment's protection of the accused from infamy. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
at 450-53.
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invoked the jury's understanding of this work in his defense of the
British soldiers accused of murder after the Boston Massacre. In his
opening he argued:
May it please your honors, and you, gentlemen of the jury:
I am for the prisoners at the bar, and shall apologize for it only in
the words of the Marquis Beccaria: If I can but be the instrument of
preserving one life, his blessing and tears of transport shall be a
sufficient consolation to me for the contempt of all mankind.148
But such mention was not mere form to the educated colonial Amer-
icans.149 Instead, they took the writings of the philosophers and the
publicists very seriously. Even before the Revolution began, there were
some Americans already protesting the complex mixture of English
and American law based largely on antiquated English precedent. 50
The desire to simplify the legal system, a sentiment akin in origin to
the reforms of Beccaria and the other Enlightenment thinkers,'' was
increasingly popular in the years just prior to the beginning of the
Revolution. 15 2 In fact, the Continental Congress, which met at Carpen-
ter's Hall in 1774, turned expressly from the traditional English
sources to the French for guidance on reconstruction and codification
148. F. KIDDER, HISTORY OF THE BOSTON MASSACRE 232 (1870). John Adams
made this statement in quoting from Beccaria's treatise which had been translated into
English and published in London in 1770. On June 28, 1770, Adams copied a pas-
sage from Beccaria into his diary: "If, by supporting the Rights of Mankind, and of
invincible Truth, I shall contribute to save from the Agonies of Death one unfortunate
Victim of Tyranny, or of Ignorance, equally fatal; his Blessing and Tears of Trans-
port, will be a sufficient Consolation to me, for the Contempt of all Mankind. Essay
on Crimes and Punishments: Page 42." This passage did in fact appear in the open-
ing statement of his October defense of Captain Preston, who was accused and later
acquitted in the Boston Massacre trial. Adams bought his own copy of Beccaria's
works in the Italian edition in Paris in 1780, and it is among his books in the Boston
Public Library. 1 ADAMSS PAPERS 352-53 & n.2 (Butterfield ed. 1961).
In a July 20, 1786 entry in his dairy while in London, Adams again copied a
passage from Beccaria in both English and Italian. "Every Act of Authority, of one
Man over another for which there is not an absolute Necessity, is tyrranical." 3 id.
at 194.
149. See A. NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLU-
TION 1775-1789, at 455 (1969).
150. G. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AiERICAN REPUBLIC 300 (N. Carolina
Press 1969).
151. Id.
152. It was also popular after the revolution. See Comment, The Origins of Law
Reform: The Social Significance of the Nineteenth Century Codification Movement
and Its Contribution to the Passage of the Early Married Women's Property Acts, 24
BUFFALO LAW REv. 683 (1975).
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of parts of the common law. William Bradford, in a letter to James
Madison, noted this trend when he wrote that the members of the
Congress were making frequent use of the Philadelphia city library,
[b]y which we may conjecture that their measures will be wisely
plan'd since they debate on them like philosophers; for by what I was
told Vattel, Barlemaqui, Locke & Montesquie[u] seem to be the
standar[d]s by which they refer either when settling the rights of the
Colonies or when a dispute arise, on the Justice or propriety of a
measure.
163
David Rothman, in The Discovery of the Asylum, 15 after noting
American acceptance at this time of general Enlightenment doctrines,
turns specifically to Beccaria's influence. He mentions John Adams'
use of a quotation from Beccaria in his defense of the British soldiers
implicated in the Boston Massacre. Then, after quoting heavily from
Beccaria's treatise On Crimes and Punishments, Rothman stated:
The young republic quickly took this message to heart, for it fit
well with its own history and revolutionary ideals. Americans fully ap-
preciated that the laws could be a tool of the passions of a handful
of men. Did this not explain almost every piece of British colonial
legislation after 1763? They believed that they had also witnessed the
self-defeating quality of cruel punishments. ... With the Revolu-
tion, declared Eddy, fitting Beccaria's doctrine into an American con-
text, "the spirit of reform revived ... strengthened by the general
principles of freedom."'155
Thus, a self-conscious effort at legal reformation, stimulated by the
18th century Enlightenment sources and the favorable circumstances
of conflict and social change in the American colonies during the
Revolutionary era, was initiated.
C. The Eighth Amendment's "Cruel and Unusual Punishments"
Clause
What the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments was in-
tended to forbid remains questionable. Acceptance of the clause as the
153. Letter from William Bradford to James Madison, October 17, 1774, in 1
THE PAPERS OF JATs MADISON 126 (W. Hutchinson & W. Rachal eds. 1962)
[hereinafter cited as MADISON PAPERS].
154. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 143.
155. Id. at 60.
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outcome of only 17th century English thought and history is to ignore
nearly 100 years of American historical development. It is also a denial
of 100 years of critical thinking by the philosophers who were widely
read and influential in the new, as well as the old, world prior to the
formulation of the bills of rights in the state constitutions and the
Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. Such an omission is
clearly illogical, yet that is, in effect, the position of the Supreme
Court. As a result, the Weems doctrine, which purports to control ex-
cessive penalties under the eighth amendment, is in danger of being
forgotten, along with the historical precedents which should be per-
ceived as its constitutional basis.
It is through Beccaria and his pervasive influence on prominent
colonial leaders that the philosophical and historical basis for the
Weems principle is provided. This mode of analysis is strengthened
by the fact that the connection between Beccaria's treatise On Crimes
and Punishments, and the formulation of certain constitutional pro-
visions, particularly the eighth amendment, is not an entirely new
idea.156 While the permissible punishments for crime in 18th century
England still included torture and mutilation, some of which were
followed in America, in large part "a more enlightened [criminal]
code was to be adopted as the limits of English law were abandoned
in favor of the principles advocated by reformers such as Beccaria."'u5
It will be demonstrated that the colonists not only set out to revise
the criminal codes, but also intended to impose firm constitutional
limits on permissible penalties.
1. Jefferson and Criminal Law Reform. Thomas Jefferson was a
medium through which the Enlightenment ideas were put to prac-
tical use. He may also be regarded as a connecting link between Bec-
caria and what was to become the eighth amendment. Beccaria and
156. 'Beccaria[s] Essay On Crimes and Punishments helped shape our Fifth
and Eighth Amendments . . . ." I. BRANT, supra note 14, at 464. Professor Franklin
traces the influence of Beccaria on the fifth amendment. Franklin, supra note 102, at 41.
See also Franklin, Romanist Infamy and the American Constitutional Conception of
Impeachment, 23 BUFFALO L. REv. 313 (1974).
157. R. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 21. The concern with punishment for crimes
in the colonies certainly antedated the English Declaration of Right. The Charter of
Maryland of 1632 gives the power to execute the laws "by the Imposition of Fines,
Imprisonment, and other Punishment whatsoever; even if it be necessary, and the
Quality of the Offense require it, by Privation of Member, or Life . . . ." SOURCES
OF OUR LiBERTIES, supra note 8, at 107. And the Massachusetts Body of Liberties
of 1641 provided: "For bodilie punishments we allow amongst us none that are in-
humane, Barbarous or cruel." Id. at 153.
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Beccarian ideas were known to Jefferson and, in fact, played a part
in the plan for the extensive reforms he and other Virginians had in
mind for their state. In Jefferson's Common place Book, 158 several ex-
tracts from Montesquieu's works in French, and other more numerous
passages from Beccaria in Italian, appear in his own handwriting.159
These were written from 1774-1776 when Jefferson became a mem-
ber of the Virginia Committee of Revisors for the reform of the legal
system. While he was engaged in the project to revise the laws of his
state, Jefferson showed that his concerns were much the same as Bec-
caria's and that he followed the Italian jurist in much of his thinking.
In his correspondence with Edmund Pendleton in the summer of
1776, his preoccupation with the penal project was manifested. Pendle-
ton wrote:
I don't know how far you may extend your reformation as to Our
Criminal System of Laws. That is has hitherto been too Sanguinary,
punishing too many crimes with death, I confess, and could wish
to see that changed for some other mode of Punishment in most
cases, but if you mean to relax on all Punishments and rely on Virtue
and the Public good, as Sufficient to promote Obedience to the Laws,
You must find a new race of Men to be Subjects of it, but this I dare
say was not your meaning, however I have heard it insisted on by
others.160
Jefferson, intending to implement material changes in the criminal
law to coincide with Enlightment theory, in an effort to explain his
intention and quiet developing fears about the radicalness of his pro-
gram, replied:
The fantastical idea of virtue and the public good being a sufficient
security to the state against the commission of crimes, which you
say you have heard insisted on by some, I assure you was never
mine. It is only the sanguinary hue of our penal laws which I meant
to object to. Punishments I know are necessary, and I would pro-
vide them, strict and inflexible, but proportioned to the crime.
Death might be inflicted for murther and perhaps for treason if you
would take out the description of treason all crimes which are not
such in their nature. Rape, buggery & c. punish by castration, all
158. THE COMMONPLACE Boox OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (G. Chinard ed. 1926).
159. P. SPURLIN, ROUSSEAU IN AMERICA 1760-1809 (1969).
160. Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Thomas Jefferson, August 10, 1776, in
1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 490 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as
JEFFERSON PAPERS].
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other crimes by working on high roads, rivers, gallies & c. a certain
time proportioned to the offense. But as this would be no punish-
ment or change of condition to slaves ... let them be sent to other
countries. By these means we should be freed from the wickedness
of the latter, and the former would be living monuments of public
vengeance. Laws thus proportionate and mild should never be dis-
pensed with.' 6
Here we have an American reference which recognized that both the
mode of the punishment and the duration of it must be proportioned
to the crime in order that the penalty be just and legitimate. It is this
strain of thought, obviously influenced by the powerful tradition of
enlightened thought known to Jefferson from his readings of Montes-
quieu and Beccaria, which surfaced in Weems and which must be
considered an integral part of eighth amendment jurisprudence.
By 1778, Jefferson, as part of the revision project, had written:
"64. A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Here-
tofore Capital."'162 Incorporating Beccaria's aversion to capital punish-
ment, the bill provided that an offender be deprived by life only for
a few particularly heinous offenses. The remainder of crimes were to
be punished in accordance with a legislatively prescribed scale of
penalties, carefully proportioned to the offense. 1 3 In this fully anno-
tated bill, references to Beccaria's treatise appear four times in foot-
notes.114 This effort to bring criminal law penalties into conformity
with enlightened ideas was presented to and rejected by the Virginia
Legislature in 1785. In 1796, however, it was given approval when it
was again introduced. In his autobiography, Jefferson looked back on
these events.
Beccaria, and other writers on crimes and punishments, had satis-
fied the reasonable world of the unrightfulness and inefficacy of
[punishing] crimes by death; and hard labor on roads, canals and
other public works, had been suggested as a proper substitute. The
Revisors had adopted these opinions, but the general idea of our
country had not yet advanced to that point. The Bill, therefore, for
proportioning crimes and punishments was lost in the House of
Delegates by a majority of a single vote. . . . In the meanwhile,
the public opinion was ripening, by time, by reflection, and by the
161. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, August 26, 1776, Id.
at 505 (emphasis added).




example of Pennsylvania.... In 1796 our legislature resumed the sub-ject, and passed the law for amending the penal laws of the Common-
wealth. 165
As Jefferson indicated, there was a transformation in the attitude of
the people of Virginia which must necessarily have derived from gov-
ernmental reforms begun in 1776 by almost every colony and brought
to fruition during and after the Revolutionary years. The circum-
stances which precipitated the change in American attitudes was the
call of the Continental Congress of May, 1776, to restructure the state
governments. 1 6 This exigency provided the opportunity for the en-
lightened ideas of Beccaria and others, as utilized by Thomas Jeffer-
son, Edmund Pendleton, George Mason, George Wythe, and Thomas
Lee, the Virginia law revisors, to be applied to the formation of a
new structure of government. 67
2. State Declarations and Constitutions. In Virginia, another
course of events was in progress which also was to greatly influence
the rights and liberties which are the basis of our constitutional gov-
ernment. A general convention of delegates elected from the state's
counties was called to discuss the question of colonial independence. 68
Contemporaneously with the declaration of their independence, a
committee was set up to prepare a declaration of rights and a plan of
government.16 9 George Mason, a member of the Virginia Criminal
Law Revision project with Thomas Jefferson, became the chief archi-
tect of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. 70 The document was to be-
come one of the most influential in American history. It was repub-
lished throughout the American states, and was copied, in part, by
Franklin in the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights and by John
Adams in the Massachusetts Declaration. 71
165. M. MAESTRO, supra note 125, at 141-42, citing 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 67 (1903). A February 15, 1787 letter written by James Madison, however,
suggests that "[tihe rage against Horse stealers had a great influence on the fate of the
Bill." 11 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 158, at 152. This seems to mean that the
Bill was not rejected in principle, rather particular provisions were opposed, and this
led to the one vote loss.
166. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 38.
167. G. CHINARD, THOMAS JEFFERSON 90 (1929).
168. R. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 39.
169. Id. at 40.
170. Id. at 47.
171. 1 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 153, at 171; C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 6-7 (1925).
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As the official journal of the convention is composed merely of
formal entries, and the record of the proceedings authored by Edmund
Randolph was not written until 30 years after the fact, there remains
little if any material from which to glean the committee's intent re-
garding particular provisions. What evidence we do have shows that
Mason proposed the entire program which was ratified by the commit-
tee after much discussion.1'7 2 Article II of the Committee Draft of the
Declaration of Rights written on May 27, 1776, stated: "That excessive
bail bught not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted."' 1 3 This provision was a committee
edition which became Article IX in the final draft. It is thought that
there may have been additional wording to this part when the Com-
mittee presented it, but that it may have been reduced to its persuasive
brevity by Mason himself. 74 From such limited sources, the legal his-
torian must draw a conclusion as to what was intended by Mason and
his fellow drafters. While we admit that this article was taken almost
word for word from the English Bill of Rights, this may have been
merely the linguistic device through which Mason declared the uni-
versal principle clearly known to his fellow countrymen. Mason clearly
was in agreement with the other leaders of Virginia in 1776 as
indicated by a comparison of the preamble to this document and Jef-
ferson's wording of the Declaration of Independence,'" and it has
been suggested previously that the ideas of enlightened criminal law
reform were current throughout Virginia at this time.
Beccaria and Enlightenment influence were also strong in Penn-
sylvania, which itself had an impressive and unique tradition in the
criminal law sphere. From the time Pennsylvania was granted its royal
charter in 1681, it had led the way toward an enlightened approach
172. R. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 42.
173. 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 284 (R. Rutland ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as MASON PAPERS].
174. Id. at 285-86. Mason described his own drafting style in his notes for the
committee of Revisors: "General rules in drawing provisions & c., which would do only
what the law would do without them, to be omitted. Bills to be short; not to in-
clude matters of different natures; not to insert an unnecessary word; nor omit a use-
ful one." G. CHINARD, supra note 167, at 91. "The brevity of the first and second
Constitutions, (i.e. the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights) due to Romanist
influence, anticipates the succinctness of the 18th century French civil code and of
all subsequent Romanist codification." Franklin, supra note 113, at 36.
175. R. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 235 (Preamble to the Virginia Declara-
tion of Rights).
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to the administration of justice. By that charter, William Penn was
given the power to make, with the consent of the assembly, any and
all laws he deemed necessary. 176 Pursuant to that grant of power, Penn
attempted to enact a humane and rational criminal code which pro-
vided for penalties less than death for all crimes except murder;177 but
the proposed code was subsequently halted under Queen Anne. As
soon as independence had been proclaimed, however, Pennsylvania
became, in the opinion of one writer, the site of the most "compre-
hensive examination of assumptions about government that else-
where were generally taken for granted."'178
The spearhead of this movement to create a new and more equal
republic was a small group of Philadelphians who had formed "The
Whig Society" a few months previously. This faction was led by such
men as Thomas Paine, David Rittenhouse, James Cannon (a profes-
sor at what was soon to be the University of Pennsylvania), and Col.
Timothy Matlock17 9 The group agitated for change, and managed to
turn their movement for constitutional reform into an actual constitu-
tional convention just one month after the Continental Congress had
recommended that new governments be set up.8 0 Admittedly influ-
enced by the French philosophers like Voltaire, Rousseau, and Montes-
quieu,' 81 the delegates prepared both "A Declaration of Rights" taken
almost verbatim from the "Virginia Bill of Rights"'8 2 and a constitu-
tion which has been called the "closest approach to political perfec-
tion ever devised by mankind.' 8 3 The provision in the body of the
constitution with which this paper is concerned read as follows: "The
penal laws, as heretofore used, shall be reformed by the future Legis-
lature of this State, as soon as may be, and punishments made in some
cases less sanguinary and in general more proportionate to the
crimes."' 84 It is interesting to note that the emphasis seems to be more
176. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder,
97 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 760 (1949).
177. Roscoe, Observations on Penal Jurisprudence and the Reformation of Crimi-
nals, in REFORM OF CRIMINAL LAw IN PENNSYLVANIA 84 (M. Horwitz ed. 1972).
178. G. WOOD, supra note 150, at 226.
179. R. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 53; Keedy, supra note 176, at 765.
180. R. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 53.
181. Keedy, supra note 176, at 764.
182. R. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 54, citing 3 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 220.
183. R. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 55 (paraphrasing by Rutland of Brissot de
Warville, a French Revolutionary leader and observer of America).
184. PA. CONST. § 38 (1776), cited in Keedy, supra note 176, at 766-67. Keedy
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upon the proportionality between crime and punishment than on the
sanguinary aspects. In other words, a limited use of torture or so-
called inhuman or barbarous types of punishment for heinous offenses
might be less objectionable than the imposition of excessive terms of
imprisonment, a theoretically "humane" punishment. As will be dem-
onstrated, the courts in the United States for the most part have moved
forward vigorously to banish all forms of "torture" from the prisons,
but, in contradistinction to the Pennsylvania constitutional mandate,
have been reluctant to strike down sentences excessive in duration. As
has been pointed out, this idea of a proper relationship between the
crime and the offense was discussed by Montesquieu and popularized
in the United States by the Voltaire edition of Beccaria's essay.'8 5
The fact that condemnation of cruel and unusual punishments
appeared in this constitution in the particular language was not an ac-
cident but was well within Pennylsvania tradition, as emphasized by
subsequent events. The continued interest in criminal law reform
was evidenced in a letter in 1785 from Benjamin Franklin, who had
been the President of the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, to
Benjamin Vaughan. Franklin objected to the lack of proportionality
in English law which provided death for offenses ranging from theft
to murder. He said "[t]o put a man to Death for an Offense which
does not deserve Death, is it not Murder?"'180 This criticism of the
failure of English law to recognize proportionality must naturally have
arisen from the tendency during this transitional period from British
to American rule to repudiate those things English in favor of ideas
which were largely French. In the year following this correspondence
a law was finally passed in Pennslvania which abolished the death
penalty for robbery, burglary, buggery, and sodomy. 8 7
notes that the requirement that punishments be more proportioned to the crimes was
derived from Montesquieu. He quotes the latter's The Spirit of the Laws:
It is an essential point that there should be a certain proportion in punish-
ments, because it is essential that a great crime should be avoided rather that
a lesser . . . . It is a great abuse amongst us to subject to the same punish-
ment a person that only robs on the highway, and another that robs and
murders.
Id. at 767 & n.67.
185. Keedy, supra note 176, at 767-68.
186. M. MAESTRO, supra note 117, at 129, quoting 9 WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
FRANxLIN 292 (Smyth ed. 1907).
187. Keedy, supra note 176, at 767 n.72.
In the preamble to the act of 1786, Keedy emphasizes an explicit paraphrase
of Montesquieu. The preamble reads: "that the cause of human corruptions proceed
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Although in 1790 a reactionary constitution supplanted the con-
stitution of 1776, the trend toward enlightened criminal reform per-
sisted. In the same year that the new constitution was adopted, James
Wilson gave a group of lectures at the College of Philadelphia on the
"Necessity and Proportion of Punishments" in which he discussed the
views of Montesquieu and Beccaria.88 Just two years later, Dr. Ben-
jamin Rush, a professor of medicine at the University of Pennsylvania,
published an essay entitled: "Considerations of the Injustice and
Impolicy of Punishing Murder by Death." He too stated that Beccaria
and Voltaire were responsible for his thinking that even capital
punishment for murder was not in the best interests of society. 8 9
Similarly, William Bradford, later to be President George Wash-
ington's Attorney General, also referred in his writings on criminal
law to the ideas of Montesquieu and Beccaria as having set forth the
general principles upon which penal laws ought to be founded. 90
Finally, Robert J. Turnbull, in A Visit to the Philadelphia Prison
which appeared in 1796, discussed the Pennsylvania experiment with
penal law reform stating that "[s]everal circumstances combined to
make the proposed alteration expedient, and among others the small
and valuable gift of the immortal Beccaria to the world had its due
influence."' 9' This last publication appeared simultaneously with the
passage of Jefferson's proportional criminal law bill. As Jefferson him-
self stated, these events in Pennsylvania, which kept the spirit of en-
lightened reform alive, may have provided the example needed to
facilitate Virginia's action.19 2 Thus, these two states which had strong
and highly educated leaders, well aware of the Enlightenment ideas
of Beccaria, Montesquieu and Voltaire, certainly incorporated these
concepts into their own state constitutions.
Three other states in addition to Virginia and Pennsylvania had
written and approved constitutions in 1776. The Maryland delegates
more from the impunity of crimes than from the moderation of punishments . .. ."
Id. at 768 & n.73. Montesquieu reads: "If we inquire into the cause of all human
corruptions, we shall find that they proceed from the impunity of criminals, and not
from the moderation of punishments." MONTESQUIEU, supra note 129, at 84.
188. Keedy, supra note 176, at 768.
189. Id. at 769.
190. Bradford, An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death is Necessary in
Pennsylvania, in REFORM OF CRIMINAL LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 177, at 3.
191. M. MAESTRO, supra note 125, at 138, quoting R. TURNBULL, A VISIT TO
THE PHILADELPHIA PRISON 1 (1796).
192. See quotation accompanying note 165 supra.
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met in Annapolis to formulate both a constitution and a declaration
of rights. Since the journal of the convention does not record the de-
bates when the committee draft was presented to the full body for
approval, 193 there is little historical evidence from which to interpret
the resulting provisions. There were, nevertheless, two articles, passed
which relate to the question of permissible punishments. Article XXII
was almost an exact repetition of the clause used in the Virginia
Declaration. 194 However, an additional provision, Article XIV, went
beyond a mere recitation of the accepted verbal formula: "That san-
guinary laws ought to be avoided, as far as is consistent with the
safety of the State: and no law, to inflict cruel and unusual pains
and penalties, ought to be made in any case, or at any time here-
after."' 95 The concept of punishment consistent with the safety of the
state was clearly Beccarian in origin, and was reiterated by Jefferson
in his correspondence with Pendleton. 196 In addition, the language
itself, using both "pains" and "penalties," seems to connote punish-
ments which inflict corporal pain, such as torture, and other penalties,
such as imprisonment, which might be excessively severe in their dura-
tion when compared with the offense committed. Delaware and North
Carolina also produced constitutions in 1776, employing the already
common expression of the Virginia Declaration to prohibit cruel pun-
ishments.197
In 1778, South Carolina adopted a comprehensive structure of
government after almost two years under a temporary constitution.
Although a separate bill of rights was not adopted, the same safe-
guards were incorporated into the body of the constitution as had been
done in Georgia, New Jersey and New York. A group of articles at
the end of the South Carolina Constitution contained those rights
and included one looking toward a reform of penal laws that would
193. R. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 58.
194. MD. CONST. § XXII (1776), in 1 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 281, reads:
"That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
or unusual punishments inflicted; by the courts of law."
195. MD. CONST. § XIV (1776), id. at 281.
196. See text accompanying notes 160-161 supra.
197. DEL. CONST., Declaration of Rights, § 16 (1776), in Schwartz, supra note
11, at 278, provides: "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted." N.C. CONST., Declaration
of Rights, § 10 (1776), id. at 287, states: "That excessive bail should not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted."
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make punishments "more proportionate to the crime."' 98 Two years
later, Massachusetts too enacted a constitution and a bill of rights
which largely "represented a collection of provisions from earlier bills
of rights rather than an original work."'1 9 This copying process in-
volved more than mere convenience for the state framers; it showed
that they had developed a coherent idea of what human rights needed
protection against government encroachment. 20
The last of the states to write constitutions and bills of rights in
this pre-federal period was New Hampshire. It is necessary to examine
the pertinent provision of this bill because it was the most detailed
and thus gives the best idea of what evils its framers intended to ame-
liorate. Further, because it is the last provision of the Revolutionary
period, its drafters most likely benefited from their knowledge of
previous attempts. As in the Maryland Constitution, there were two
provisions. The first provision specified:
All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offense.
No wise legislature will affix the same punishment to the crimes of
theft, forgery and the like, which they do to those of murder and
treason; where the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against
all offenses, the people are led to forget the real distinction in the
crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant with as little
compunction as they do those of the lightest dye: For the same
reason a multitude of sanguinary laws is both impolitic and unjust.
The true design of all punishments being to reform, not to extermi-
nate, mankind.201
Later in the bill of rights, a provision identical to that in the Massa-
chusetts Constitution appears 2 02 The above-quoted section indicates
that the framers of this state constitution also shared the Enlighen-
ment concern with proportionality.
198. S.C. CONST. § XL (1778), in 1 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 335.
199. R RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 80. MASS. CONST. § XXVI (1780), in 1
Schwartz, supra note 11, at 343, reads: "No magistrate or court of law shall demand
excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punish-
ments." John Adams, who was well acquainted with Beccaria, was involved in the
formulation of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights in 1780. C. WARREN, supra note 171,
at 6-7.
200. R. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 80.
201. N.H. CONST., Bill of Rights, § 18 (1783), in 1 Schwartz, supra note 11,
at 377.
202. Id. § 33, at 379.
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There is, therefore, an essential pattern formed by these state
constitutional provisions running from the Virginia Declaration of
Rights through the New Hampshire article. The pattern revealed is
that of a tension betwen a desire to express the human rights to be
guaranteed in a widely-known formula, and a desire to explicate the
underlying assumption that penalties not only torturous but also dis-
proportionate to the offense should be included in the proscription. 20 3
3. The Passage of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. It was not until the last week of the Constitutional Con-
vention in Philadelphia that George Mason proposed, almost as an
afterthought, but "doubtless with his beloved Virginia bill of rights
in mind,"204 the idea that the Constitution should be prefaced with
a Bill of Rights which he said would only take a few hours to pre-
pare.20 5 The motion he made was unanimously defeated along with
subsequent attempts to get a bill of rights accepted piecemeal. A mo-
tion for a second convention was also defeated.2 00 Dissatisfied with
his failure, Mason wrote the Objections to this Constitution of Gov-
ernment in which he went into detailed criticism of the fact that there
was "no declaration of any kind, preserving the liberty of the press,
or the trial by jury in civil causes; nor against the danger of standing
armies in time of peace. ' 207 Copies of the Objections were circulated
throughout the states, precipitating an emotional dialogue between
the Antifederalists and the Federalists. The latter believed that the
movement for a bill of rights was just a vehicle for the Antifederalists'
basic opposition to the strong central government which had been
created.208 An Answer to Mason's Objections, written by Iredell, later
to be a delegate to the North Carolina convention which ratified the
Constitution, was published in pamphlet form. The author argued
that there was no necessity for limiting congressional power under
the new Constitution so that cruel and unusual punishments would be
203. For a discussion of drafting style, see note 174 supra. See also note 205
infra and accompanying text.
204. M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
185 (1913).
205. 2 RECoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 476 (Farrand ed. 1911) [herein-
after cited as REcoRDs].
206. R. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 121-22.
207. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 24, 1787, in
RECORDS, supra note 205, at 135-36.
208. G. WOOD, supra note 150, at 537.
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proscribed.20 9 Iredell reasoned that incorporating this prohibition from
the state constitutions into the Federal Constitution would be im-
proper since, in his opinion, the provision was intended to constrict
the abuse of power by the English crown and not to limit Parlia-
ment. He also stated that "the expression 'unusual and severe' or 'cruel
and unusual' surely should have been too vague to have been of any
consequence, since they admit of no clear and precise signification."
210
The fact that Iredell made a casual reference to alternate formula-
tions of the critical phrase of the eighth amendment suggests that the
ultimate choice may have been more a matter of convenience than a
substantive choice incorporating English feudal content. Iredell saw
the defect of indefiniteness as irremediable: if the prohibited punish-
ments were enumerated, the government could use those not so listed;
and if permissible punishments were listed, flexibility would be in-
hibited and the legislature led "into a labyrinth of detail" further
confusing the situation.211 If, as Iredell claimed, the rights of Amer-
icans were limited to their English content, there would have indeed
been no reason for their retention for the circumstances in the new
nation were certainly different from a monarchy. Furthermore, the
lack of specificity of the provision does not diminish its constitu-
tional importance. Rather, the inability to enumerate particulars is
suggestive of the breadth, not the limits, of the cruel and unusual
punishments clause.
The battle over ratification of the Constitution proceeded as the
idea of a Bill of Rights gained increasing popularity. Thomas Jeffer-
son, then serving as minister to France, soon took a firm position fa-
voring addition of a Bill of Rights, and summarily dispatched letters
to his friends in America which were circulated throughout the colo-
nies.212 Pennsylvania was the first to ratify the Constitution, having
defeated a proposed Bill of Rights which included a provision, very
similar to the original Virginia provision, prohibiting cruel and un-
usual punishments.21 3 Shortly after the time Jefferson had become
209. Iredell, Answer to Mason's Objetions, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 359 (P. Ford ed. 1888).
210. Id. at 360.
211. Id.
212. R. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 134.
213. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE CONSTITUTION 658 (J. Elliott ed. 1901) [hereinafter cited as DEBATES]. Pro-
posed article 13 read: "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
827,
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definite in his ideas favoring a Bill of Rights, Massachusetts met in
convention. The debate was frenzied in its intensity with the Anti-
federalist position strongly argued.214 A compromise resulted which
was implemented by sending recommended amendments along with
the ratification of the Constitution-a proposal which set a precedent
for the remaining states. While debate on whether to adopt a Fed-
eral Bill of Rights was, in every state, lengthy and acrimonious, the
merits of any single provision were rarely discussed. For example, in
New York, Alexander Hamilton recorded the passage of the cruel
punishment provision succinctly: "-Bail-or unusual excessive
punisht.-agreed. ' 215
In Virginia there was some debate recorded on the issue of
whether the cruel and unusual punishment provision prohibited tor-
ture. George Mason, drafter of Virginia's Declaration of Rights, as-
serted that the suggested Bill of Rights, which Virginia's ratifying
convention was adding to the Constitution in order to assure its
passage, certainly did prohibit torture.
For that one clause expressly provided that no man can give evi-
dence against himself and that . . . in those countries where tor-
ture is used, evidence was extorted from the criminal himself. An-
other clause of the bill of rights provided, that no cruel and unusual
punishments shall be inflicted; therefore torture was included in the
prohibition. 216
214. The only recorded debate on the subject of cruel punishment was a state-
ment by Mr. Holmes as follows:
What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy circumstances is
the consideration, that Congress have to ascertain, point out, and determine,
what kind of punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes.
They are nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheardof
punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional
check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild
instruments of their discipline.
Massachusetts Convention Debates, January 30, 1788, id. at 111.
215. New York Ratifying Convention, in 2 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 897. The
rarity of discussion could well be due to the fact that people knew what they meant.
216. 3 MASON PAPERS, supra note 173, at 1085. The only additional debate
recorded was a statement by Patrick Henry arguing for a pre-ratification Bill of Rights.
He saw problems for a constitution without one:
In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the
restriction of not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and in-
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As this assertion by Mason is particularly directed against a statement
by Mr. Nicholas, another delegate to the convention, that tortures were
not included in this prohibition, there is no reason to infer that
Mason was covering the entire content of the provision in his answer.
By the time the Constitution was ratified, the adoption of a
Federal Bill of Rights was generally conceded. The Federalists, who
had included a promise for a Bill of Rights in their campaigns for
Congress, 217 formed the majority in favor of amending the Constitu-
tion. However, it soon became obvious that the amendments faced a
coalition of opposition made up of those who wanted no changes and
those who did not agree as to which specific guarantees should be
written into the new Constitution.2 18 With a clear recognition of the
political dynamics of the situation in the Congress, James Madison
began work on the project. He decided to confine his efforts to an
enumeration of simple, acknowledged principles, the ratification of
which would meet with the least opposition.219 In framing his proposi-
tions, Madison, with much labor and research, "hunted up all the
grievances and complaints of newspapers, all the articles of the state
conventions, and the small talk of their debates." 220 This account of
Madison's effort "points accurately to the tie between federal guaran-
tees of freedom and those pronounced earlier in the states, either in
their own constitutions or in the conventions that ratified the new
federal charter."2'
Madison himself had been a member of the committee which
drew up the Virginia Declaration of Rights, so it is not surprising
that he turned to the state provisions and particularly relied on the
flicting cruel and unusual punishments. These are prohibited by your declara-
tion of rights. What has distinguished our ancestors? That they would not
admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may intro-
duce the practice of the civil law in preference to that of the common law
•.. of torturing to extort a confession of the crime.
3 DEBATES, supra note 213, at 447-48.
217. R. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 196.
218. 3 JAmEs MADISON FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 264 (I. Brant ed. 1950).
219. 10 CONG. DEB. 433 (1834) [1824-1837].
220. Letter from Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight, June 11, 1789, in I. BRANT,
supra note 14, at 87.
221. Id. at 87.
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amendments of Virginia and Massachusetts222 for content.223 But as
the states themselves were only 13 years old, the real link must be
drawn further back to the law reform movement in general and the
particular abuses of European feudalism at which those reforms were
aimed. Madison was a member of the group of educated Americans,
well-versed in history and political theory. He had noted the the im-
pact of the Enlightenment and specifically Beccaria on the Virginia Re-
visal of the Laws, 224 and, in fact, had included the treatise of Beccaria
in the list of recommended books which he had reported as proper for
the use of the Continental Congress. 225 In drawing his amendments
from the state propositions, he necessarily incorporated both the spe-
cific phrases used and, also, the ideas of the Enlightenment-particu-
larly those of Beccaria. These ideas were received first by the colonial
leaders, Jefferson, Adams and Franklin, then transmitted into the
state constitutions, and finally incorporated through Madison into the
Bill of Rights-particularly the eighth amendment. Madison proposed:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 226 There is very little re-
corded debate on what was to become the eighth amendment. It was
passed on August 17, 1789, despite objections that it was too indefinite
and too strict.22 T7
222. See Franklin, supra note 118, at 94.
223. R. RUTLAND, supra note 11, at 206.
224. 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 153, at 393.
225. I. BRANT, supra note 14, at 38-39.
226. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
227. The debate reads as follows:
Mon. Aug. 17, 1789
Mr. Smith of South Carolina, objected to the words "nor cruel and un-
usual punishments," the import of them being too indefinite.
Mr. Livermore-The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity,
on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no mean-
ing in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant by the terms excessive
bail? Who are to be the judges? What is understood by excessive fines? It
lies with the court to determine. No cruel and unusual punishment is to
be inflicted; . . . . If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring
others from the commission of it could be invented, it would be very prudent
in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have some security that this will
be done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any
declaration of this kind. Vote taken and measure passed.
I ANNALS OF CONG. 782-83 (1789) [1789-1824].
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IV. STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS:
INCREASING JUDICIAL AcrlvisM UNDER WEEMS
The theoretical importance of the Weems decision has not been
matched by its practical application:
[T]he courts have been largely unwilling to second guess the
legislature as to what is an adequate penalty for any particular of-
fense. Therefore, although the prohibition in theory serves to prevent
disproportionate punishments, it is a rare defendant who can get
relief by means of a claim of this nature. The principle, however,
is there, awaiting a broadened use in the future.228
It is indeed unfortunate that the above commentary written in 1961
still presents, with only minor exceptions, an accurate assessment of
the vitality of the Weems doctrine. However, the courts have not hesi-
tated to find that punishments that may be termed "inherently cruel"
violate the eighth amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments"
clause.229 It has been suggested that the principle reason for the fail-
ure of the Supreme Court to utilize the Weems doctrine has been its
institutional need for an historical justification for its decisions.2380
This should no longer be an obstacle in enforcing the constitutional
mandate of Weems prohibiting excessive or disproportionate punish-
ments. As this Comment demonstrates, the Weems doctrine is his-
torically justified by the influence of Beccaria and the Enlightenment
writers on the colonial leaders, and in turn on the texts of the state
constitutions, and ultimately on the content underlying the eighth
amendment itself. In fact, after Robinson, which generally has been
regarded as having applied the eighth amendment to the states, some
of the federal and state courts have employed the excessiveness concept
with increasing vigor. These courts have left the Supreme Court lag-
ging behind231 in the implementation of the prohibition against ex-
cessive penalties because they have not felt constrained by the insti-
tutional considerations so important to the Supreme Court; instead,
they have seized upon the Supreme Court's language in Weems and
attempted to give substance to its promise.
228. Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 846, 848-49 (1961).
229. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
230. See C. MILLER, supra note 7, at 4.
231. Accord, Turkington, supra note 50, at 155.
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In the federal courts there have been a considerable number of
instances in which the excessiveness principle has been used to in-
validate certain punishments. 232 For example, in Ralph v. Warden,233
the court answered the question of the constitutionality of the death
sentence for a rapist who had neither taken or endangered the life
of his victim in the negative. In holding that the eighth amendment
forbids such punishment, the court assumed the viability of the
Weems proportionality concept as determined through a comparative
law test 4 The Ralph court stated that
two factors coalesce to establish that the death sentence is so dis-
proportionate to the crime of rape when the victim's life is neither
taken nor endangered that it violates the Eighth Amendment. First,
in most jurisdictions, death is now considered an excessive penalty
for rape .... Second, when a rapist does not take or endanger the
life of his victim, the selection of the death penalty from the range
of punishment authorized by statute is anomalous when compared
to the large number of rapists who are sentenced to prison.233
The state courts also have found increasing use for the Weems
principle.2 s In People v. Lorentzen2 7 a mandatory minimum sentence
of 20 years imprisonment for selling marijuana was held to violate
both the United States and the Michigan constitutional provisions
against cruel and unusual punishment because it was in excess of any
penalty that would be suitable to fit the crime. The court assumed
that Weems was controlling and employed the comparative approach
-in view of the punishments for the same crime in other jurisdictions
232. E.g., Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973) (mandatory life sen-
tence imposed under recidivist statute was so disproportionate to the crimes of writ-
ing a check for $50 on insufficient funds, transporting forged checks across state lines
and paying, that it amounted to cruel and unusual punishment); Adams v. Carlson,
368 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. I1. 1973) (confinement of prisoners in solitary for 16 months
because of their participation in a prison work stoppage was disproportionate to the
offense committed and, therefore, cruel and unusual punishment); Sostre v. Rockefeller,
312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (solitary confinement for more than 15 days was
so disproportionate to the offense of refusing to answer warden's questions fully and
truthfully that it amounted to cruel and unusual punishment).
233. 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970). See Note, 40 GEo. WASH. L. RaV. 161 (1971).
234. 438 F.2d 786 at 789-90.
235. Id. at 793.
236. State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 788 (1952); Dembowski v. State,
251 Ind. 250, 240 N.E.2d 815 (1968); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374
(Ky. 1968); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Ore. 629, 281 P.2d 233 (1951); State v. Kim-
brough, 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273 (1948).
237. 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 817 (1972).
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and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the offender, the sentence
was found so excessive that it "shocks the conscience."'2 8
In recent years, it has been the California courts which have been
most active in the area of invalidating punishments because of their
disproportionality. In the opinion in In re Lynch,239 the California
Supreme Court ruled for the first time that a punishment could vio-
late the state constitution if it is "so disproportionate to the crime
for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends funda-
mental notions of human dignity. '240 This decision interpreted the
state constitution as providing the same protection against excessive
punishment as the Weems court found in the federal provision2 4 In
determining whether the petitioner's sentence was unconstitutionally
severe, the court viewed the indeterminate sentence as having the ef-
fect of a sentence to the maximum term possible. Thus, Lynch, who
was sentenced to not less than one year for a second indecent exposure
offense was, in effect, serving a life term for the purpose of this con-
stitutional attack. In order to determine what would be a gross dis-
proportion, the court adopted the tests that had been used in other
jurisdictions. The court looked first at the nature of the offense and
the offender, then at the penalty as compared with other penalties in
the same jurisdiction, and finally at the penalty for the same offense in
other jurisdictions. Thus, the court attempted to, established some
standards which would take into account the individual offender. The
factors to be weighed included a consideration of any possible miti-
gating circumstances in a particular case, the penological purposes of
punishment as applied to the particular defendant, and a general ap-
238. Id. at 181, 194 N.W.2d at 834. The addition of the "shock to conscience"
element of Palko v. Connecticut raises the question of whether a court must first be
shocked before it will consider a punishment excessive. See also People v. Sinclair, 387
Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972). The defendant's conviction on the charge of the
illegal possession of marijuana was reversed. Two judges held that the statutory cate-
gorization of marijuana with narcotics denied equal protection. Two other judges were
of the opinion that a minimum sentence of 9Y years constituted cruel and inhuman
punishment because it was excessive in relation to the offense.
239. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
240. Id. at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr at 226. Prior to Lynch, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had recognized that punishments of excessive severity for ordinary
offenses may be cruel and unusual. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 654, 493 P.2d
880, 897, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 169 (1972).
241. See Comment, California's Cruelty Criteria: Evaluating Sentences After In
Re Lynch, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 636, 637 (1974); Note, 6 LOYOLA OF Los ANGELES L.
Rav. 416, 419 (1973).
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proach toward the usual punishment imposed both within and without
the jurisdiction for this and other more serious crimes. 242
In New York there is some evidence of the existence of the
Weems principle in the interpretation of both the state and the fed-
eral constitutional guarantees against the imposition of cruel and un-
usual punishments. In Politano v. Politano,243 the Supreme Court of
New York, Kings County, held that a 31 month prison term for failure
to pay alimony was unconstitutionally excessive. Recently, in People v.
Mosely, 244 a sentence under the recently enacted New York Drug Law,
which provides lengthy mandatory sentences, was held to be cruel and
unusual under both the federal and state constitutions because it was
greatly disproportional to the offense. The defendant was convicted of
criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. The statu-
tory penalty provided for a mandatory minimum of 1 to 81/ years,245 a
maximum of life imprisonment, 46 lifetime parole,24T no possibility of
probation,248 no plea bargaining,2 49 and no possibility for commit-
ment to the Drug Abuse Control Commission. 2 0 The Court believed
that Weems, as refined by Lynch, provided the tests for determining
the constitutionality of the punishment. The standards used were:
(1) the nature of the offense, (2) the nature of the offender, (3) the
punishment compared to that of other crimes in the jurisdiction, (4)
the punishment for the same offense in other jurisdictions, (5) the
recommendation of model legislation, and (6) the conscience of the
court.
2 5 1
The Mosely decision was reversed by the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in People v. McNair.252 The
242. In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974) where
a defendant convicted as a repeat offender for furnishing heroin under a statute pre-
cluding parole for a minimum of 10 years without regard to mitigating circumstances
was denied habeas corpus relief although the presumption part of the statute was held
cruel and unusual because it could be severed from the prescribed penalty. See also
Comment, Marijuana Possession and the California Constitutional Prohibition of Cruel
or Unusual Punishment, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1136 (1974).
243. 146 Misc. 792, 262 N.Y.S. 802 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
244. 78 Misc. 2d 763, 358 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Monroe County Ct. 1974).
245. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 70.00(3) (a) (iii) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
246. Id. § 70.00(2) (a).
247. Id. § 60.05(1).
248. Id. § 70.40(l).
249. N.Y. Calm. PRO. LAW § 220.10(6) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
250. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 81.25(b) (3) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
251. 78 Misc. 2d at 766, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
252. 46 App. Div. 2d 476, 363 N.Y.S.2d 151 (4th Dep't 1975).
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very disagreement on the constitutionality of the draconian New York
Drug Law is evidence of the tension that exists between those courts
that have been willing to actively apply the Weems doctrine to prison
sentences and those other courts which feel compelled to adhere to a
more circumscribed approach grounded in the tentative Supreme
Court adherence to the excessiveness principle.2 53 The McNair court,
citing In re Kemmler, acknowledged that the Supreme Court had
initially "adopted a 'historical' interpretation of the Cruel and Un-
usual Punishments Clause." However, the court then noted that, "the
'looking backwards' approach was decisively repudiated in Weems." 254
In this manner, the McNair court has explicitly stated the assumption
that has been implicit in all other eighth amendment decisions-the
Weems excessive punishment doctrine is not historically justified and,
therefore, to be sparingly employed.
CONCLUSION
The strands of progressive adjudication which have appeared in
the state court and lower federal court decisions have thus far failed
to influence the Supreme Court to move forward with the Weems
doctrine against excessive prison sentences. Terms of imprisonment,
however, must be seen as an historically novel form of punishment 255
because
253. The disagreement is manifested by the various holdings of these cases. People
v. Broadie, 45 App. Div. 2d 649, 360 N.Y.S.2d 906 (2d Dep't 1974) (declaring section
70(3) of the New York Penal Law not to be cruel and unusual, although harsh and in
many cases unjust, because narcotic offenses are particularly destructive to society);
People v. Venable, 46 App. Div. 2d 73, 361 N.Y.S.2d 398 (3d Dep't 1974) (declaring
section 70(2) of the New York Penal Law not to be cruel and unusual); People v.
McNair, 46 App. Div. 2d 476, 363 N.Y.S.2d 151 (4th Dep't 1974) (declaring sections
70(2) (a) and 70(3) (a) not to be cruel and unusual).
It is interesting to note that newly-elected Governor Carey of New York has ap-
pointed two panels which are "studying the entire question of drug abuse with an eye
toward a major re-vamping of the state's stringent narcotic laws, which went into
effect in 1973." N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (city ed.). Governor Carey
is properly attempting to check the legislative excesses championed by former Governor,
now Vice President, Nelson Rockefeller, as part of a law and order campaign. The
courts also have a clear duty under Weens, as justified by the Beccarian influence, to
hold as violative of the eighth amendment legislative abuses in establishing sentencing
standards.
254. 46 App. Div. 2d at 480, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
255. Under the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court had felt it was ill-equipped
to deal with electronic eavesdopping with traditional common-law doctrine and con-
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[i]n earlier eras imprisonment was mainly a period of limbo, a way-
station in the legal process where the suspected offender looked for-
ward to the hangman's noose or lash. As late as 1771 the French
jurist Jousse could claim that imprisonment was simply a means of
holding the suspected criminal before trial and not a method of punish-
ment; and not until the 19th century did imprisonment achieve its
present eminence as a major penal sanction. 250
Due to that novelty, it is no surprise that prison systems and prison
sentences did not directly concern the framers. Nevertheless, there is
no reason to permit a narrow reading of the amendment to exempt
the imposition of prison sentences from constitutional scrutiny under
the Weems excessive punishment doctrine under the eighth amend-
ment.25
7
It is important to note the ironic results that follow when the
courts view their primary and only clearly defined role under the
eighth amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments" clause to be
to prevent tortures and other inherently barbarous pains and penal-
ties. The courts have, in effect, been properly concerned with the
arbitrary and admittedly cruel actions of prison administrators in
subjecting prisoners, even for one night or one week, to exceedingly
cepts. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Court stated that the
fourth amendment extended protection only against searches wherein there had been a
physical trespass on the premises of the suspect. The historically novel method of
searching with electronic instruments was held not to offend the fourth amendment.
However, in Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court abandoned the
limited common-law concept of "trespass" and "physical penetration" to approach the
problem in terms of justifiable expectations of privacy. It is evident therefore, that if
the language and meaning of the Bill of Rights were confined to its purported common
law or English feudal content, the amendments-the eighth amendment included-
would merely exist as a historical curiosity, with no constitutional impact or force in
20th-century America. Since this is manifestly not so, it is apparent that the content of
the amendments is not determined solely by its English feudal meaning.
256. G. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES xi (1958) (footnotes omitted). It was
not until the 19th century that the penitentiary system began to be organized. In the
1820's, in New York, the first state prison at Auburn was established and followed
shortly thereafter by Sing-Sing in Ossining, New York. In Pennsylvania, at this time,
the prison system began to take hold, resulting in facilities at Philadelphia and Pitts-
burgh. Connecticut built its first prison in 1827, Massachusetts and Maryland in 1829,
New Jersey in 1830, Ohio and Michigan in the 1830's, and Minnesota, Indiana and
Wisconsin in the 1840's. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 143 at 79-81. See also THE OFFICIAL
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA at 6-9 (1972).
257. This does not, of course, preclude the possibility that at times, prison or prison
conditions can in themselves constitute cruel and unusual punishment as has been tra-
ditionally understood as barbarous or torturous penalties. G. SYKES, supra note 256, at
63-83.
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revolting and appalling conditions.258 However, lengthy prison sent-
ences of 10, 20, 30 or more years, in conditions which may be only
marginally better, are routinely upheld.P59 Such practices not only
present an unfortunate and absurd contrast, they are also incorrect.
f
258. These punishments have been found cruel and unusual. Nelson v. Heyne,
491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974) (corporal punishment administered in medium correc-
tional institution for boys 12 to 18 consisting of beatings causing painful injuries);
Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (administration of drug which in-
duces vomiting as part of treatment of mental institution inmate for violating an insti-
tutional rule); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972) (confining inmate
naked in strip cell without bedding, deprived of toilet paper, towels, soap, and his eye-
glasses); Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971) (detaining civil rights pro-
testors naked in unhygienic facilities, without bedding and heating); Jackson v. Bishop,
404 F.2d 571 (8th Oir. 1968) (use of strap on prisoners); Berch v. Stahl, 373 F. Supp.
412 (W.D.N.C. 1974) (solitary confinement of inmate for more than 30 days without
any clothing in 5 by 7 cell); Aikens v. Lash, 371 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ind. 1974)
(Stripcells with inadequate lighting and ventilation); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp.
594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (level of noise which constituted a threat to hearing and mental
health); Osborn v. Manson, 359 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Conn. 1973) (confinement of
prisoners in segregation cells which had no running water); Landman v. Royster, 333
F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971) (denial of physical necessities including imposition of a
bread and water diet); Lollis v. Department of Social Serv., 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (confinement of 14 year-old inmate of training school for girls in stripped room
in night clothes with no recreation or reading matter); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp.
825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (confinement of inmates in isolation cells which were over-
crowded, dirty, unsanitary, and pervaded by bad odors from toilets); Hancock v.
Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) (confinement of prisoner naked, forcing
him to sleep on bare concrete floor, deprived of adequate light and ventilation);
Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (confinement of prisoner in
cell with no light, no furnishings except a toilet, and containing no means for the
prisoner to clean himself); People v. Bland, 52 Mich. App. 539, 218 N.W.2d 56 (1974)
(convicted criminal who is denied medical treatment); Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa.
83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971) (county prison conditions which were so degrading and
disgusting that personal safety of inmates was in danger).
259. These are cases where excessive sentences were approved by the courts be-
cause they were within the extreme limits established by the legislature. E.g., Wood v.
South Carolina, 483 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1973) (concurrent terms of five years im-
prisonment for making obscene telephone calls were within ten year maximum); Yeager
v. Estelle, 489 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1973) (500 year sentence for murder); Johnson v.
Beto, 337 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Parker v. Bounds, 329 F. Supp. 1400
(E.D.N.C. 1971) (sentence within statutory limits is not cruel and unusual); Ormento
v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (sentence imposed within limit
of statute cannot amount to cruel and unusual punishment, here, 40 years for con-
spiracy to import drugs); Crow v. Coiner, 323 F. Supp. 555 (N.D.W.Va. 1971)
(sentencing juvenile to a maximum of 10 years for larceny was within statute); Gar-
ner v. State, 16 Md. App. 353, 297 A.2d 304 (1972) (10 years for attempt to obtain
money by false pretense); Clanton v. State, 279 So. 2d 599 (Miss. 1973) (10 year
sentence for possession of marijuana); State v. Edwards, 282 N.C. 578, 193 S.E.2d
736 (1973) (sentence of 30 years to life for burglary and escape) ; Jones v. State, 504
S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (999 years for murder); Albro v. State, 502
S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (sentence of 100 years for offense of possession of
marijuana); Williams v. State, 476 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (20 years for
possession of marijuana).
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The courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, should pro-
ceed, then, in a more affirmative manner to strike down legislatively
prescribed prison sentences by utilizing the Weems excessive punish-
ment doctrine under the eighth amendment. In so doing, the courts
will be acting consistently Xith the influence of Beccaria and other
Enlightment writers. Such progressive action is historically justified.
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